The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity by Figley, Paul F.
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals Scholarship & Research 
2009 
The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity 
Paul F. Figley 
American University Washington College of Law, pfigley@wcl.american.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, and 
the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Figley, Paul F., "The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity" (2009). Articles in Law Reviews & 
Other Academic Journals. 1243. 
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/1243 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship & Research at Digital Commons @ 
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles in Law Reviews & 
Other Academic Journals by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington 
College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
THE APPROPRIATIONS POWER
AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Paul F. Figley*
Jay Tidmarsh**
Discussions of sovereign immunity assume that the Constitution
contains no explicit text regarding sovereign immunity. As a result,
arguments about the existence-or nonexistence-of sovereign im-
munity begin with the English and American common-law
doctrines. Exploring political, fiscal, and legal developments in
England and the American colonies in the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries, this Article shows that focusing on common-law
developments is misguided. The common-law approach to sovereign
immunity ended in the early 1700s. The Bankers' Case (1690-
1700), which is often regarded as the first modern common-law
treatment of sovereign immunity, is in fact the last in the line of
English common-law decisions on sovereign immunity. After (and
in part because of) the Bankers' Case, settling claims against the
Crown became a function of Parliament, swept up within its newly
won powers over finance and appropriations. After examining com-
parable developments in the American colonies and during the
Confederation period and the formation of the Constitution, the
Article demonstrates that the Appropriations Clause embedded in
the Constitution the principle of congressional supremacy-and a
resulting lack of judicial power-over monetary claims against the
United States, a point recognized by early cases and commentators.
As such, the Appropriations Clause provides a textual basis for the
federal government's immunity from suits on claims seeking money
damages.
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INTRODUCTION
At a certain level of abstraction, historical arguments for and against so-
vereign immunity have a common quality. Those who use history to argue
against the existence of a constitutional basis for sovereign immunity point
to procedural devices by which the Crown could be sued-such as the peti-
tion of right, the monstrans de droit, and the traverse of office'-to infer that
sovereign immunity did not exist in absolute form in English common law
from the Middle Ages on; the argument by extension is that no such doctrine
existed in the U.S. Constitution at the time of the founding. For those who
argue for reading sovereign immunity into the Constitution, by contrast, the
limitations of these devices-including the need for the Crown's formal con-
sent to suit, the lack of remedies for the torts of the Crown, and the
cumbersomeness and infrequency of suit 3-point toward an immunity in
English law that cemented itself in the interstices of the Constitution." These
opposing positions share three commonalities. First, appeals to historical
evidence often distill a complex history into a monolithic "yes" or "no" an-
swer to the question of American sovereign immunity. Second, historical
arguments focus principally on the common law,5 ignoring English political
1. For a discussion of these devices, see infra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
2. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 764-70 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting); Louis L. Jaffe,
Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-19 (1963).
3. For a discussion of these limitations, see infra notes 30-31, 36-44 and accompanying
text.
4. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435-46 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting); cf.
Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (finding that Congress's lack of power to waive a state's immunity from private
suits for damages inheres in the structure of the Constitution).
5. Classic legal histories of English and American sovereign immunity are Edwin M.
Borchard, Government Liability in Ton (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25); Louis L. Jaffe,
Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L. REv. 209 (1963); and Jaffe,
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and financial history that also bears on the question. Third, both sides agree
that the appeal to history is necessary because the Constitution itself is silent
on the existence-or nonexistence-of sovereign immunity.'
In this Article, we seek to dislodge these assumptions. In the American
system, the permutations created by three independent variables (federal vs.
state immunity, damages vs. injunctive relief, and suits against the sovereign
vs. suits against officials) yield eight distinct categories of immunity.7 This
Article focuses on the central category: suits brought against the United
States for damages. Incorporating contemporaneous developments in
English politics and economics, and in American colonial history, we pro-
vide the context in which to understand the constitutional foundation for this
type of federal sovereign immunity.'
In doing so, we recover an early understanding of sovereign immu-
nity-suggested by St. George Tucker 9 and Joseph Storyl°-that the
immunity of the United States from damage actions has an explicit source
in the Constitution: the Appropriations Clause, which bars the expenditure
of money "but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."" Among
supra note 2. The classic history of English sovereign immunity from medieval times to the early twen-
tieth century is 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 4-45 (3d ed. 1944).
6. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1201, 1205
(2001) ("Sovereign immunity ... is a right that cannot be found in the text or the framers' intent.");
David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection, 86 TEx.
L. REV. 929, 952 (2008) ("Sovereign immunity is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution .... ").
Compare Alden, 527 U.S. at 741 (arguing that the best inference from silence is the existence of
state sovereign immunity), with Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 104 (1996) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the best inference from silence is a lack of state sovereign immunity).
One of the few scholars to argue that the Constitution's text speaks to sovereign immunity-and
finding the requisite waiver in the Petition Clause of the First Amendment-is Professor Pfander.
James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to
Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 899 (1997).
7. The eight categories are: (1) sovereign immunity for the United States against suits seek-
ing damages; (2) sovereign immunity for the United States against suits seeking injunctive relief;
(3) sovereign immunity for federal officials against suits seeking damages; (4) sovereign immunity
for federal officials against suits seeking injunctive relief; (5) sovereign immunity for a state against
suits seeking damages; (6) sovereign immunity for a state against suits seeking injunctive relief;
(7) sovereign immunity for state officials against suits seeking damages; and (8) sovereign immunity
for state officials against suits seeking injunctive relief. In categories 3, 4, 7, and 8, a further division
can be made between official-capacity suits and individual-capacity suits. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
8. We do not suggest that our historical analysis carries over to the other seven categories of
sovereign immunity. English common law varied for suits against the Crown and suits against offi-
cials. See Jaffe, supra note 2, at 2-19. Moreover, England had no federal division of political
authority. Equity precedents regarding sovereign immunity were few. One of the few cases seeking
equitable relief against the Crown was Pawlett v. Attorney-General, Hardres 465, 145 Eng. Rep. 550
(Exch. 1668). In Pawlett, relief was sought in the Court of Exchequer, a fact that bears significance
for the scope of sovereign immunity. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 426-428 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 429 and accompanying text.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, el. 7. The first half of Clause 7 is the Appropriations Clause. The
second half is the Statement and Accounts Clause. Clause 7 reads in full: "No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to
time." Id.
May 2009] 1209
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Americans who knew the history of Parliament's rise to political preemi-
nence and recollected the resistance of colonial assemblies to royal
governors, 2 the Clause was a political given. Its "power of the purse" was
intended as the counterweight to the President's "power of the sword."'3
The move made by Tucker and Story was to recognize that the third
branch of government-the judiciary-fell within the reach of the Appro-
priations Clause. Their move is plausible, but hardly required. There is an
evident distinction between entering a judgment against the United States
and appropriating its funds; the lack of the latter power does not necessarily
imply the lack of the forner.14 Indeed, although courts have occasionally
noted the link between the Appropriations Clause and federal sovereign
immunity, 5 the references are sparse, short, and usually not substantive.
Academic commentary is similarly thin; the few scholars who have consid-
ered the connection have generally failed to be impressed with it.'
6
The burden of this Article is to show that the connection between sover-
eign immunity and the appropriations power is stronger and closer than is
usually believed. Part I examines the histories of sovereign immunity and
appropriations in England; it focuses particularly on the seventeenth century,
when the ideas of parliamentary sovereignty, fiscal control, and sovereign
12. See infra Sections I.B, II.A.
13. Modem scholarship on the Appropriations Clause has concentrated on the extent to
which the appropriations power allows Congress to control the actions of the executive. Compare
Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988) (arguing that Congress can
control executive conduct by refusing to appropriate funds for certain actions), with J. Gregory
Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1162 (stating that Congress alone has
the power to decide whether to appropriate funds and that the President retains authority to deter-
mine how to spend appropriated funds).
14. For instance, a court could enter a judgment against the United States but rely on Con-
gress to appropriate the funds necessary to pay it. Or a court could enforce its judgment by ordering
the executive branch to seize assets of the United States-an action that arguably does not directly
impinge on Congress's power of appropriation. But see Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
20, 20 (1846) (refusing to enforce a writ attaching the wages of a navy seaman because funds "ap-
propriated to certain national objects" cannot be "diverted and defeated by state process or
otherwise").
15. See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423-24 (1990); Pullman Constr.
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 23 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Federal sover-
eign immunity today is nothing but a condensed way to refer to the fact that monetary relief is
permissible only to the extent Congress has authorized it, in line with Art. I, § 9, cl. 7... "); Jaffee
v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1251 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (stating that federal
sovereign immunity "has constitutional underpinnings" and citing the Appropriations Clause).
16. The best commentary is Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty,
Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 521, 535-36, 543-46, 592-605
(2003) [hereinafter Jackson, Suing the Federal Government]. See also Susan Bandes, Reinventing
Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 344 nn.259 & 263 (1995) (arguing
that the Appropriations Clause does not bar a judgment requiring a federal official to pay damages);
Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98
YALE L.J. 1, 94-95 n.379 (1988) [hereinafter Jackson, Supreme Court] (arguing that the Appropria-
tions Clause might create a "constitutional basis" for sovereign immunity in cases seeking monetary
recovery from the United States, but also noting that a court's inability to "compel the appropria-
tion" may not mean that a court "lacks power to issue a judgment"); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term,
Leading Cases, 104 HARv. L. REv. 129, 295 (1990) ("[T]he Court [in Richmond] may have unwit-
tingly established a constitutional fountainhead for federal sovereign immunity, at least as to money
claims.").
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immunity underwent significant development and ultimately intersected in
the Bankers' Case.7 The Bankers' Case, a set of lawsuits that wound
through the English courts from 1690 to 1700, figures prominently in ac-
counts of some opponents to sovereign immunity because it permitted an
action that arose from a breach of contract by the Crown. 8 We describe the
way in which the Bankers' Case must be understood against the backdrop of
Parliament's rise to preeminence in the English constitutional order-a rise
rendered successful only by Parliament's control over appropriations. Part II
examines the analogous American history during colonial times, at the time
of the Constitutional Convention, and during the early years of the Republic.
We demonstrate that, during the eighteenth century, the constitutional pre-
eminence of legislatures in determining governmental appropriations-a
preeminence that the Appropriations Clause embedded in the Constitution-
supplanted the common law as the basis for sovereign immunity. We con-
clude by considering the implications of this thesis for the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
I. ENGLISH ANTECEDENTS
This Part begins by sketching England's five-hundred-year history of
sovereign immunity prior to the American Revolution. We then describe a
more contested constitutional conflict-supremacy between the Crown and
Parliament-whose outcome turned on the question of government finance.
We end by describing how these two currents in English legal, political, and
economic history merged at the start of the eighteenth century into a princi-
ple of legislative supremacy over appropriations-a principle that requires a
reinterpretation of the standard account of sovereign immunity in England.
A. Sovereign Immunity in England Before 1776
Compressing the history of English sovereign immunity into a few
pages is a difficult task, made easier only by a number of excellent prior
treatments.19 The main lines of the history are clear enough, although
17. The best collection of the proceedings in the Bankers' Case is The Case of the Bankers
[hereinafter Bankers' Case], in 14 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1 (photo. reprint
2000) (T.B. Howell ed., 1812). Some proceedings are also found in other reporters. See R v. Homely
& Williams, Carthew 388, 90 Eng. Rep. 825 (Exch. Chamber 1696); R v. Homby (The Bankers
Case), 5 Mod. 29, 87 Eng. Rep. 500 (Exch. Chamber 1695); The Bankers Case, Skinner 601, 90
Eng. Rep. 270 (Exch. Chamber 1695); R v. Hornby, Comberbach 270, 90 Eng. Rep. 472 (Exch.
Chamber 1694); In re Hombee, 1 Freeman 331, 89 Eng. Rep. 246 (Exch. 1692). For some of the
same reported proceedings-as well as the lawyers' arguments in the Court of Exchequer-see
SAMUEL DODD'S REPORTS 1678-1713 AND MISCELLANEOUS EXCHEQUER CASES 1671-1713, at 98,
103, 104, 111, 168 (W. Hamilton Bryson ed., 2000) [hereinafter DODD'S REPORTS].
18. See, e.g., 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 32-42; Jaffe, supra note 2, at 7-8.
19. The classic treatment of the origins of sovereign immunity is Ludwik Ehrlich, Prceed-
ings Against the Crown (1216-1377), in 6 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY pt. 12
(Octagon Books 1974) (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1921). For other treatments, see 9 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 5, at 4-45; 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 197, 515-18 (2d ed. 1899); and Jaffe, supra note 2, at 1-19.
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some judges and scholars have not been sufficiently attentive to its nu-
ances and context to extract modem salience.
We begin with an uncontested point: from the thirteenth century for-
ward, it was possible to sue the Crown. In the earliest days, when the
lines of adjudicatory authority blurred in a soup of "proto-courts"-
councils such as the early Parliament and quasi-administrative tribunals
over which the King himself sometimes presided-all requests for royal
justice, including requests to bring suit against the Crown, began as peti-
tions that passed before the King and Chancellor.2° Over the course of the
centuries, the process for bringing suit against private individuals became
routinized; obtaining a writ-the document necessary to commence a
case in one of the three common-law courts (Common Pleas, King's
Bench, and the Exchequer)-was no longer a matter of royal grace but a
ministerial function handled within the Chancery.2 The same became true
for invoking the jurisdiction of the Chancery, which operated the alternate
system of justice known as equity.22
Bringing suit against the Crown, however, never lost the original qual-
ity of a respectful request for royal aid. Because the King's courts were
constituted by, and therefore regarded as inferior to, the King himself, the
notion that courts could as a routine matter entertain suits against the
King was unimaginable.23 But subjects could always petition the King for
24his permission to hear their claims against him. Soon distinctions among
petitions emerged. On the one side were petitions issued as a matter of
25royal grace or discretion; on the other were petitions of right. Petitions
of right claimed, in essence, that the petitioner's interests had been in-
jured in such a way that, had the action involved a private defendant
20. See I WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 354-55 (A.L. Goodhart &
H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th rev. ed. 1956); 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 13-15.
21. See I HOLDSWORTH, supra note 20, at 396-99; THEODORE FT. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 164 (5th ed. 1956).
22. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 20, at 445-76; PLUCKNETr, supra note 21, at 180-81.
23. Initially, this lack of amenability to suit was an offshoot of the well-accepted medieval
principle that a lord could not be sued in his own manor court. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at
8; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 518. The question was also caught up in the nature of
the King: whether he was an ordinary man (and thus subject to suit) or the personification of the
realm (and thus above the law). Medieval theory tended to the former view; the latter view emerged
later. See 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 458-69 (5th ed. 1942) (discussing
the shift in views of the Crown's nature); I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 511-18;
Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 39-41. In neither event was the King thought to be subject to legal process
in the same manner as ordinary citizens. See 2 BRACTON DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS AN-
GLIE [BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND] 33 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel
E. Thome trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (ca. 1258) [hereinafter BRACTON] (stating that "no writ
runs against" the King).
24. See Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 34, 82.
25. The distinctions between the two forms of petition, and the exact procedures used in the
petition of right, were never completely worked out, in part due to the development of other proc-
esses for suing the Crown. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 13-16, 22, 37; infra notes 32-35
and accompanying text. Professor Ehrlich dates the widespread use of petitions of right to early in
the reign of Edward 1 (1272-1307). Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 84.
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rather than the Crown, the petitioner would have had a legal claim. The
petition of right asked the Crown to submit itself to the laws that applied
to private persons. With the standard notation, "Let right be done, 26 the
King usually endorsed such petitions. Indeed, the well-known phrase
"The King can do no wrong" did not carry, as it did in later days, 27 the
implication that the King was immune from legal process; to the contrary,
the aphorism meant that the King was incapable of being a party to injus-
tice and would therefore consent to suits when his actions harmed the
legal interests of a subject.2 ' Although obtaining permission to sue the
Crown was never as routine as obtaining a writ to sue a private party,
29
suits against the Crown were unremarkable.
Equally uncontested is the elasticity of the judicial system in fashion-
ing processes for resolving these suits. Although the petition of right
emerged as an early mechanism for holding the Crown accountable, it
possessed certain shortcomings. For instance, a petition of right only au-
thorized a commission to investigate the merits of the claim; if the
commission found in favor of the petitioner's right, the petitioner still
needed to take additional steps to bring the case into court.30 The
Crown enjoyed procedural advantages not available to ordinary litigants.3
Indeed, because of the delays and complexities in the petition of right, the
courts developed other, streamlined processes for the most common
disputes involving the Crown. As these processes-the monstrans de
droit, the traverse of office, and the writ of liberate-became popular,"
26. In law French, "soit fait droit." Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 97.
27. The Tudors would eventually transform the understanding of monarchy by conflating the
King as a person with the King as the embodiment of sovereignty. See I POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra note 19, at 511. For the effect of this transformation on the meaning of "the King can do no
wrong," see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *239 (Univ. Chi. Press 1979) (1765).
Blackstone argued that the phrase meant two things: that any illegality of the King's agents should
not be imputed to the King, and that, because "the law will not suppose the king to have meant
either an unwise or an injurious action," it will assume that the King was somehow deceived to
engage in such action. Id.
28. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note5, at 19-22; Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 42-44, 127-30.
29. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *236 ("[l1f any person has, in point of property, a
just demand upon the king, he must petition him in his court of chancery, where his chancellor will
administer right as a matter of grace, though not upon compulsion.").
30. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 22.
31. See id. at 23-24.
32. The details of the monstrans de droit and the traverse of office are not significant to this
Article. Both involved methods for determining the Crown's interests in property held in feudal
obligation. For a further discussion, see 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 24-26; Bankers' Case,
supra note 17, at 77-82 (opinion of Lord Keeper Sommers); and Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 175-79.
Parliament extended these remedies by legislation. 2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 8 (1548); 36 Edw. 3, Stat. 1, c.
14(1362).
The writ of liberate allowed the Exchequer to pay the Crown's obligations. 9 HOLDSWORTH, Su-
pra note 5, at 21. The Crown or Chancellor issued the writ when authorizing work to be performed on
the Crown's behalf; a copy went to the Exchequer to serve as an accounting record that justified the
Exchequer's payment. H.M. Colvin, Book Review, 4 ARCHITECrURAL HIST. 95, 95-96 (1961) (review-
ing 4 CALENDAR OF THE LIBERATE ROLLS PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE (1959)). Thus,
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the petition of right fell into disuse." At the start of the eighteenth cen-
tury, in the Bankers' Case, the House of Lords blessed yet another process-
the issuance of a writ against the barons of the Exchequer-when neither
the monstrans de droit nor the traverse of office was available and the peti-
tion of right was not requested.34 Indeed, by the mid-eighteenth century,
Blackstone declared confidently that "the law ha[d] provided a remedy" to
subjects should the Crown "invade their rights, either by private injuries, or
public oppressions.""
But this history, which appears to refute the existence of a foundational
English (and, by extension, American) immunity in the years before the
American Revolution, tells less than the complete story. First, the Crown
retained a special place in the legal order. Although the monstrans de droit
did not require the Crown's consent,36 the petition of right-a more gener-
ally useful remedy--did; and however liberally it might have been granted,
consent was never a given. In addition, the writ of rege inconsulto provided
a means for the Crown to suspend proceedings against it;" sometimes
judges waited for a command from the Crown to proceed with a case.9
More generally, although views of the Crown's constitutional prerogatives
changed through history,4 the King always had a sphere of independent
authority on which neither Parliament nor the courts could intrude.4' Nor
did ordinary rules of law always apply to the King. Blackstone argued that
contract actions against the King succeeded not as a matter of legal right but
only because "no wise prince will ever refuse to stand to a lawful contract.2
Blackstone further admitted that some "public oppressions" of the King lay
beyond legal remedy. 43 Likewise, Locke (and Blackstone, who followed
Locke's reasoning) thought that tort suits against the King were impermissi-
the writ did not serve as a vehicle to force the Crown to pay obligations that it had not agreed to
incur.
33. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 28.
34. Bankers' Case, supra note 17; see infra Section I.C.
35. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *236.
36. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 26. In addition, during the reign of Henry VIII, Parliament
extended relief against the Crown in the newly created courts of Augmentations, Wards, and Surveyors.
33 Hen. 8, c. 39 (1542) (Court of Surveyors); 32 Hen. 8, c. 46 (1540) (Court of Wards); 27 Hen. 8, c.
27 (1536) (Court of Augmentations). These statutes represent early legislative efforts to establish the
scope of sovereign immunity. Although they moved the power of consent from the executive to the
legislative branch, the necessity of consent to suit remained unchanged.
37. See Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 85, 188.
38. Brownlow v. Cox, 3 Bulstrode 32, 81 Eng. Rep. 27, 29 (K.B. 1615); 9 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 5, at 23; Francis Bacon, Argument in the Case de Rege Inconsulto (Jan. 25, 1616), re-
printed in 7 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 687, 689 (James Spedding et al. eds., new ed., London,
Longmans & Co. 1879).
39. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 23.
40. See supra notes 23-25. For Bracton's views, see 2 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 33, 305-
06. For Blackstone's views, see I BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *230-326.
41. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *230-70.
42. Id. at *236.
43. Id. at *236-37.
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ble because their potential for mischief to the "peace of the public, and secu-
rity of the government" outweighed the need to compensate individuals
injured by the King's personal wrongdoing.44
Second, nearly all of the cases in which the Crown was amenable to suit
involved "real actions"-the branch of the common law that dealt with
rights in real property. The Crown's willingness to be a defendant in these
actions was both logical and necessary. In medieval England, land was the
measure of wealth, status, and power. Smith, who held land in fee (in other
words, free of feudal obligations to others), would grant Jones possession of
the land in return for Jones's agreement to provide rents or other services to
Smith; thus, Smith became the lord and Jones the vassal.46 In turn, Jones
would subdivide possession of the land between Green and Black in ex-
change for their agreement to provide Jones rents or services; Green and
Black became Jones's vassals, and Jones their mesne lord. Green and Black
might then do the same to others. The "incidents of tenure," or obligations
that ran between lords and vassals, established a latticework of relationships
that wove together the economic, social, and political fabric of English feu-
dal life. At the top of the pyramid was the Crown, of whom all land was
originally seised (according to the prevailing political theory).41 It was es-
sential that the Crown be a party to these real actions, for otherwise it might
be impossible to determine proper feudal relationships. In some cases, the
48Crown might have a direct interest in a dispute over tenure. In other cases,
the principal dispute lay between private parties; the interest of the CrownS• 49
was remote or contingent.
Over time, however, the incidents of tenure gave way; and after
Parliament abolished the last incidents in 1660,50 the most common ground
for suit against the Crown no longer existed. Although other real actions
remained,5 no general theory of sovereign liability existed. The Crown was
44. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 205, at 104 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *236 (quoting John Locke).
45. See 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 55-56 (4th ed. 1936).
46. Although it was common to provide rents (or socage tenure), other obligations could
substitute. Until its abolition, the obligation of "frankalmoin" granted possession to an abbey or
church in return for an agreement to say prayers for the grantor. Likewise, Jones might take the land
subject to a military tenure, which obliged him to serve as a knight for a certain number of days
each year. Tenure by serjeanty was a complex class of obligations usually requiring that a person
render personal services for the grantor. I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 240-96.
47. Id. at 232-33.
48. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 24.
49. Indeed, as the years progressed, some suits joining the Crown were fictional. Such dis-
putes involved two private individuals, but the processes for proceeding against the Crown
possessed advantages over other forms of action. Therefore, one party would fictitiously plead an
interest of the Crown in the dispute and add the Crown as a party. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 21, at
160-61.
50. 12 Car. 2, c. 24 (1660).
51. The remedy against the Crown in real actions was "amoveas manus," or removal of the
Crown's hands from the land. In some cases, such judgments might also involve an award of dam-
ages against the Crown. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 20-21.
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subject to an action for the payment of money in some early cases.52 But
because the common law did not develop a general theory of contractual
obligation until the seventeenth century,53 these cases do not support an
overarching view of the Crown's liability for breach of contract.54
Third, in a way that our modem sensibilities have difficulty compre-
hending, procedural form dominated substantive thinking at common law.5"
The question was never whether the sovereign should be liable; the question
was whether a form of action existed to hold the sovereign liable.16 The
monstrans de droit and the traverse of office streamlined real actions against
the Crown; they provided neither monetary recovery nor a procedure to sue
the Crown generally. After these remedies developed, the petition of right-
a broader but more cumbersome form that could in theory have been the
procedural vehicle for recovering money from the Crown-fell into desue-
tude, not to be resurrected until the nineteenth century.57 We have already
mentioned the lack of any writ by which the Crown could be held responsi-
ble for its torts." Thus, although procedures existed to hold the Crown
accountable in specific situations, no generally applicable process held the
Crown responsible for its wrongdoing. Given the lack of ready procedure,
any modem effort to tease from the historical material a general, substantive
theory of sovereign liability is misguided.
Finally, the few cases in which damages might have been awarded
against the Crown involved a restriction that is of critical, although over-
looked, importance: they were filed in the Court of Exchequer. Like all royal
courts, the Exchequer began as an administrative wing of the Crown.59 But
unlike the other royal courts, the Exchequer never completely lost its duality
52. Such cases rarely resulted in an award of money, which was scarce; the Crown preferred
to grant (and many creditors preferred to receive) land or the proceeds associated with one of the
Crown's incidents of tenure. See Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 32.
53. See, e.g., Slade's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 92 b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (Exch. 1602).
54. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 21.
55. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389-90 (New
York, Henry Holt & Co. 1886). As Maine states,
So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts of Justice, that sub-
stantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure; and
the early lawyer can only see the law through the envelope of its technical forms.
Id. at 389.
56. Indeed, even in the Bankers' Case, which is sometimes regarded as the first case in the
modem era to address sovereign immunity, the issue was one of procedure rather than substance:
whether a writ could issue against the barons of the Exchequer to require them to pay an obligation
of the Crown. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 241, 247-248 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 19-
20, 42-43 (noting the lack of remedy for torts).
59. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 21, at 11-12, 146-47. Although they achieved a measure of
independence from the Crown, the common-law courts were not a third branch of government as in
the modem American system. Judges were a part of the royal administration, paid by the Crown
from its revenue and appointed (and dismissed) by the Crown at its pleasure. See infra note 372 and
accompanying text.
1216 [Vol. 107:1207
Appropriations Power & Sovereign Immunity
as agency and court. In its administrative capacity, the Exchequer served as
the treasury into which royal revenue flowed and from which funds were
disbursed. In its judicial capacity, the Exchequer served as the tribunal that
held accountable those who collected revenue, and that adjudicated the li-
ability of those who did not provide revenue that the Crown argued was due.
Because it controlled the revenue, the Exchequer was the logical place for a
subject to file a monetary claim against the Crown.60
By locating claims against the Crown in the Court of Exchequer, the le-
gal system effectively made these claims a part of the machinery of
government finance. We now turn to the history of financing the English
government, and show how the struggle between the Crown and Parliament
for fiscal control, which became the cornerstone on which modem constitu-
tional democracy was built, requires a reinterpretation of sovereign
immunity.
B. Financing Government: The Foundation of Parliament's
Constitutional Preeminence
Chapter 12 of the Magna Carta seems an unlikely fountainhead for either
modem constitutional democracy or modem sovereign immunity. By agreeing
that "[n]o scutage nor aid shall be imposed on our kingdom, unless by com-
mon counsel of our kingdom,' 6' King John limited the Crown's power to raise
revenue and injected the "common counsel" (that is, Parliament) into the
process of financing government. But Chapter 12 also harbingered a power
struggle that ended, more than 475 years later, with Parliament wresting
control of government finance from the Crown. With such power came po-
litical supremacy.
1. The Gathering Storm: Finance Before the Stuarts
In the beginning, Chapter 12 affected only a portion of government fi-
nance. Until the eighteenth century, the Crown had two basic sources of
60. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *428-29 (Univ. Chi. Press 1979) (1768).
("[Chancery [cannot] give any relief against the king, or direct any act to be done by him, or make
any decree disposing of... his property .... Such causes must be determined in the court of ex-
chequer, as a court of revenue; which alone has power over the king's treasure ...."). Blackstone
mentions as the only exception the duchy court of Lancaster. Id.
61. WILLIAM SHARP McKECHNE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT
CHARTER OF KING JOHN 232 (2d ed. 1914). Translated from Latin, Chapter 12 provides in full:
No scutage nor aid shall be imposed on our kingdom, unless by common counsel of our king-
dom, except for ransoming our person, for making our eldest son a knight, and for once
marrying our eldest daughter; and for these there shall not be levied more than a reasonable
aid. In like manner it shall be done concerning aids from the city of London.
Id. "Scutage" allowed knights, who were obliged to fight for the Crown, to avoid royal conscription
by paying a fee. Eventually, scutage became nothing more than a tax levied against barons even
when no war was being fought. King John's effort in 1214 to raise scutage from two to three marks
was a major grievance that led to the baronial insurrection that forced John to sign the Magna Carta
in 1215. See id. at 69-76. "Aid" included other taxes or impositions. See id. at 232-34.
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revenue. The first was the hereditary revenue, which included rents from
Crown lands and other income.62 Some of this revenue was the Crown's by
right; the new monarch inherited it.63 The remainder of the hereditary reve-
nue was vested upon the King or Queen for life upon accession to the
throne.6 The Crown was expected to "live of its own"-in other words, to
use the hereditary revenue to pay for both the expenses of the royal house-
hold and the costs of government, including support of the navy.65
If an expense could not be met from the hereditary revenue, the Crown
needed to rely on the second source of funding: taxes. These were the "aids"
6that, under the Magna Carta, required Parliament's approval. As a general
rule, "taxes were intended as exceptional grants to meet the extraordinary
necessities of the crown., 67 These necessities typically involved wars.
61Although it occasionally appropriated funds only for specific purposes,
Parliament rarely sought to control how the King used tax revenues.70
Over time, the Crown's hereditary revenue was unable to keep pace with
inflation, increasing emoluments, an expanding civil service, and the rising
62. Other hereditary income included feudal dues, judicial fees, and customs duties (called
tonnage and poundage). See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *272-96 (detailing eighteen branches
of the Crown's ordinary revenue during the eighteenth century); PAUL EINZIG, THE CONTROL OF
THE PURSE: PROGRESS AND DECLINE OF PARLIAMENT'S FINANCIAL CONTROL 29, 49 (1959); DAVID
LINDSAY KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1845 10-12 (9th ed.
1969).
63. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *271-72. Over time, as various kings and queens
sold off Crown lands in return for money, this branch of the royal revenue decreased in value. Id. at
271-77.
64. For instance, a King or Queen was traditionally granted customs duties for life. See
EINZIG, supra note 62, at 58; KEIR, supra note 62, at 12; Gwyneth McGregor, Tudor Tactics, 10 U.
TORONTO L.J. 190, 195 (1954) (noting Henry VllI's lifetime grant of customs).
65. See WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE
POWER OF THE PURSE 12 (1994); EINZIG, supra note 62, at 29-30; KEIR, supra note 62, at 12;
McKECHNIE, supra note 61, at 239. For centuries, peacetime England had no standing army to
support. See EINZIG, supra note 62, at 29-30. The King could gain additional liquidity by borrowing
against expected tax revenues, or by compelling towns, clergy, or individuals to provide loans. See
id. at 93-99; KEIR, supra note 62, at 12. He could also obtain loans secured by the hereditary reve-
nue or his valuables. See EINZIG, supra note 62, at 95 ("The Crown itself was repeatedly pawned.").
66. See EINZIG, supra note 62, at 33-35; J.D. Alsop, The theory and practice of Tudor taxa-
tion, 97 ENG. HIsT. REV. 1, 2-3 (1982).
67. Alsop, supra note 66, at 2 ("Emergencies produced by incompetence, extravagance, or
the monarch's personal whims or ambitions were at least in theory excluded. In practice everything
depended upon the circumstances." (footnote omitted)).
68. Other necessities included such things as a voyage for Richard 11 (1377-99), the corona-
tion of Henry IV (1399-1413), and funds with which a king could pay his debts. See EINZIG, supra
note 62, at 79-80.
69. See id. at 77-78. For instance, the Saladin tithe of 1188 expressly funded a crusade. See
id. Likewise, the money collected for the ransom of Richard I (1189-99) was paid into an "'excheq-
uer of ransom."' Id. at 77. The first known example of an appropriation by the Commons was a
1340 bill of extraordinary supply, which provided that the revenue be spent on "the Maintenance
[and] the Safeguard of our said Realm of England, and of our Wars in Scotland, France, and
Gascoign, and in no places elsewhere during the said Wars." 14 Edw. 3, Stat. 2, c. 1 (1340) (al-
teration in original) (footnote omitted); EINZIG, supra note 62, at 79.
70. See F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 309 (photo. reprint
2001) (1909).
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costs of government.' As a result, the Crown began to apply more fre-
quently to Parliament for funding.7 Taxes that the Crown had previously
justified as necessary for an extraordinary circumstance were often applied
to meet the ordinary, ongoing expenses of government.73 In the time of
Henry VII (1485-1509), English subjects complained that the government
deceptively raised threats of war to obtain parliamentary grants that it used
74for other purposes. But Henry VII and the subsequent Tudors were gener-
ally able to avoid provisions in the grants that appropriated money for
specific purposes.75 Under Henry VIII (1509-47), tax revenue paid for such
standard items as stables, gifts, and the household expenses of princesses
Mary and Elizabeth.76 By the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603), the Crown
paid a large percentage of regular, peacetime government costs out of tax
receipts.77
Had it not been for its role in granting funds to the Crown, Parliament-
the prototype of the modern democratic legislature-might well have ceased
to exist. As it was, Parliament met irregularly, convening when the Crown,
facing a financial crisis, called it into session.78 The financial circumstances
needed to be dire, for convening Parliament was often an unhappy event for
the Crown. As early as the thirteenth century, Parliament established the
principle that it would discuss its grievances against the Crown before ap-
proving a levy; and within a century, it insisted that the Crown agree to
remedy these grievances. 9 Parliament's control over extraordinary grants
thus became the source-indeed, the only source-of its power over royal
71. See Alsop, supra note 66, at 16 (describing funding shortages in the time of the Tudors).
72. See Todd D. Peterson, Controlling the Federal Courts Through the Appropriations Proc-
ess, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 993, 1008-09; Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse
Strings of the Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 891 (1994).
73. See Alsop, supra note 66, at 17.
74. Id. at 21. Alsop claims, "Under the guise of abnormal necessity, taxation was justified for
the regular, recurring requirements of the state." Id. at 17.
75. See EINZIG, supra note 62, at 82; MAITLAND, supra note 70, at 309.
76. See Alsop, supra note 66, at 24.
77. See JR. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CEN-
TURY 1603-1689, at 7 (1928); Alsop, supra note 66, at 17.
78. See KEIR, supra note 62, at 37-39; infra notes 94-95, 121-122 and accompanying text.
79. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 65, at 12-13; EINZIG, supra note 62, at 42-
43. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
[tihe presentation of gravamina was made an invariable preliminary to the discussion of a
grant, the redress of grievances was the condition of the grant, and the actual remedy, the exe-
cution of the conditions, the fulfilment of the promises, the actual delivery of the purchased
right, became the point on which the crisis of constitutional progress turned.
2 WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOP-
MENT 601 (4th ed. 1906).
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action. In reality, even this degree of control depended largely on the popu-
larity and political skill of the Crown. s°
2. The Stuarts and the Struggle for Parliamentary Supremacy
The accession of the Stuarts upon the death of Queen Elizabeth set the
stage for the political storyline of seventeenth-century England: the emer-
gence, by century's end, of Parliament's constitutional preeminence over the
Crown.8 The struggle between the Stuarts and Parliament ranged over many
issues, including religion, the degree of Scottish independence, and the di-
82
vine rights of kings. But there was, above all, the problem of money. The
Crown's precarious finances and Parliament's increasing willingness to as-
sert control over royal action through control of the purse eventually
83propelled Parliament into a predominant position.
The Crown was deeply in debt when James I (1603-1625) came to the
throne, and his failure to maintain Elizabeth's tradition of frugality
exacerbated matters considerably. 4 Hopes that the rising debt might be paid
from future budget surpluses or generous parliamentary grants were neither
realistic nor fulfilled. 85 The conundrum facing the Stuart kings was that
"[p]arliamentary discussion of grants carried the distasteful corollary of
attempted extension of parliamentary power, which eventually might, and
ultimately did, lead to parliamentary control of appropriation."8 6 For instance,
the Commons of 1621 and 1624 sought to dictate key aspects of foreign
80. See EINZIG, supra note 62, at 46-47. To some extent, the ability of the Crown to obtain
loans undermined Parliament's power over taxation and expenditures. See id. at 95. Members of
Parliament, however, were often the Crown's creditors. See id. at 94.
81. See ANN LYON, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UK 197-98 (2003).
82. See M.M. KNAPPEN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 369-71,420-
48 (1942). On the difficulties of goveming England and Scotland, see PETER DONALD, AN UN-
COUNSELLED KING: CHARLES I AND THE SCOTTISH TROUBLES, 1637-1641, at 3-4 (1990). The
Stuart accession united England, Scotland, and Ireland under one king (James I of England, who
was already James VI of Scotland). See id. at 2; KEIR, supra note 62, at 155, 180. As King of Eng-
land, James was the head of the Church of England, and as King of Scotland, he was the head of the
Church of Scotland. The Church of England was Anglican in theology and governed by bishops; the
Church of Scotland was Calvinist in theology and governed by church elders. See DONALD, supra,
at 9-11; TANNER, supra note 77, at 83-84.
83. See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolu-
tion of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST.
803, 808-15 (1989).
84. See TANNER, supra note 77, at 7-8; Robert Ashton, Deficit Finance in the Reign of James
1, 10 ECON. HIsT. REV. 15, 18-19 (1957). Elizabeth's "peace expenditure [s)" ran to about £220,000;
in 1607, James I incurred expenditures of £500,000. J.R. TANNER, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS
OF THE REIGN OF JAMES I, at 336 (1930) [hereinafter TANNER, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS]. In
1603 the debt was £400,000. Through short-term measures, James I managed to reduce the debt to
£280,000 by 1610, but it ballooned to £726,000 by 1617. LYON, supra note 81, at 198-99, 202.
85. Ashton, supra note 84, at 28.
86. Id. at 18; see also TANNER, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 84, at 337 (de-
scribing the "vicious circle" under which Parliament's grievances drove the Stuarts to avoid
convening Parliaments, which required them to find other means of raising revenue, which created
new grievances, which led to even more contentious Parliaments when the King was finally forced
to convene them).
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policy and military strategy.17 The latter forced James to accept the Subsidy
Act of 1624: an appropriation scheme that required money granted for war to
be paid to treasurers, appointed by and responsible to Parliament, who would
ensure that the funds were spent as Parliament specified .
Upon his accession, Charles I (1625-1649) had repeated disputes with
Parliament over money. The Parliament of 1625 sought to exercise its power
of the purse by limiting the duration of Charles's grant of customs duties to89
one year. Likewise, the Parliament of 1626 refused to vote supplies for war
against Spain until Charles addressed its grievances (to which Charles re-
sponded by dissolving Parliament and resorting to arguably unconstitutional
revenue-raising mechanisms).90 Most significantly, the Parliament of 1628
forced Charles to accept the Petition of Right, by which he acknowledged
that no person could be compelled to make a "Guift[,] Loane[,] Benevo-
lence[,] Taxe or such like Charge without c6mon consent by Acte of
Parliament."9' Sometimes described as one of the three most important con-
stitutional documents circumscribing monarchial power,92 the Petition of
Right theoretically hogtied the King's legal authority to raise money on his
own.
Whatever its historical significance, however, the Petition of Right had
no impact on Charles's behavior.93 The Parliament of 1629 ended in turmoil.
Unhappy with the session, challenged for allegedly violating the Petition of
Right, and refusing to have his royal officers questioned, Charles summarily
ordered Parliament to adjourn and dissolved it eight days later.94 It would be
the last Parliament for eleven years."
Teetering on the brink of constitutional irrelevance, Parliament was
saved only by Charles's eventual inability to finance his government. He
87. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 65, at 13 (discussing the Commons of 1621);
KEIR, supra note 62, at 184-88 (discussing the Commons of 1621 and 1624).
88. 21 Jac. 1, c. 33 (1624); see TANNER, supra note 77, at 269-70.
89. Austin Woolrych, The English Revolution: an introduction, in THE ENGLISH REVOLU-
TION 1, 12 (E.W. Ives ed., 1968). Traditionally, a new king had been voted customs duties for life.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text. The attempt to limit Charles's right to these duties failed,
so Parliament never granted Charles the use of the duties. See Simon Healy, Oh, What a Lovely
War? War Taxation, and Public Opinion in England, 1624-29, 38 CAN. J. HIST. 439, 441 (2003).
Charles nonetheless collected them, and even rebuffed later parliamentary efforts to validate his
actions ex post facto. See LYON, supra note 81, at 208.
90. See Healy, supra note 89, at 441, 444-47; Woolrych, supra note 89, at 12-13. On the
nature of Parliament's grievances, see KEIR, supra note 62, at 189.
91. Petition of Right, 1627, 3 Car. 1, c. 1, § 8. The Petition of Right also established other
important limitations on the royal prerogative, including the abolition of imprisonment without trial.
Id. The Petition of Right should not be confused with the petitions of right by which a subject could
sue the Crown. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
92. E.g., EDWARD CREASY, THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 5
(17th rev. ed., Macmillan & Co. 1907) (1853); KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 373-74. The other two
documents are the Magna Carta and the 1688 Bill of Rights.
93. See KEIit, supra note 62, at 195-96; LYON, supra note 81, at 208-09.
94. See ESTHER S. COPE, POLITICS WITHOUT PARLIAMENTS, 1629-1640, at 11-12 (1987).
95. Id. at 1.
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faced inflation and increasing costs of governing." The costs of maintaining
the military had risen dramatically. 9' Scotland was an additional drain on
royal finances." Charles had become caught in a cycle of deficit financing;
past obligations paid from current revenue left little for present expenses
and necessitated borrowing against future income.9
Charles tried various means to generate revenue to compensate for the
lack of parliamentary grantsi 0° He instructed his lawyers to find devices to
raise revenue.'0 ' He reinstituted compulsory knighthood for certain land-
owners, thus requiring them to pay fees.'' He resurrected ancient forest
rights and fined those who could not prove title.' 3 He granted monopolies
and special favors.' ° In 1635 he extended the collection of ship money,
which was traditionally levied against seaports to supply ships and funds for
the navy, to inland counties.05 And in 1636 he used the same levy again,
demonstrating that ship money was no longer a wartime measure, but a
questionable, and potentially permanent, tax.'°6
Ship money and other fundraising artifices caused widespread ill will in
England."' From Charles's perspective at the time, however, they were suc-
cessful. He restored financial solvency,'Os and increases in taxes and
reductions in expenditures even produced a surplus beginning in 1637.' °
Had England been the only country for Charles to rule, he might have re-
tained control, ruled as an absolute monarch, and consigned English
democracy to the dustbin of history."0 But England was not Charles's only
country.
96. See KEIR, supra note 62, at 158.
97. See Mark Charles Fissel, Scottish war and English money: the Short Parliament of 1640,
in WAR AND GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN, 1598-1650, at 193, 194-95 (Mark Charles Fissel ed., 1991)
[hereinafter WAR AND GOVERNMENT].
98. In 1625, the Crown's ordinary revenue in Scotland did not meet expenses. Overall, ordi-
nary Scottish revenue was much less than ordinary English revenue. See David Stevenson, The
King's Scottish Revenues and the Covenanters, 1625-1651, 17 HIST. J. 17, 18 (1974).
99. See Ashton, supra note 84, at 29.
100. See EINZIG, supra note 62, at 60.
101. See id. Professor Tanner characterizes these efforts as "not so much a breach of the law
as a systematic attempt to take advantage of the law's technicalities." TANNER, supra note 77, at 74.
102. See COPE, supra note 94, at 135-37; EINzIG, supra note 62, at 60.
103. See COPE, supra note 94, at 138-40; EINZIG, supra note 62, at 60.
104. See COPE, supra note 94, at 140; TANNER, supra note 77, at 75-76.
105. See EINZIG, supra note 62, at 60; TANNER, supra note 77, at 76-77.
106. See TANNER, supra note 77, at 77.
107. See COPE, supra note 94, at 113-21; TANNER, supra note 77, at 79 ("[T]he King's finan-
cial policy was uniting all classes against him...
108. See KEIR, supra note 62, at 205-06.
109. See id.
110. See KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 420.
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In 1638 Scotland rebelled in the face of the effort of Charles and bishops
of the Church of England to "Anglicanise" the Scottish Church."' In 1639,
in what came to be known as the First Bishops' War, Charles organized an
army without having consulted Parliament and marched to the Scottish bor-
der." 2 After brief skirmishing with the Scottish rebels, Charles agreed to
their demands and withdrew."3 The underlying issues were not resolved, and
Charles was finally forced to summon Parliament to approve the aid neces-
sary to coerce the Scots." 4 Because Parliament refused to provide funds
until its grievances were redressed, however, Charles summarily dissolved it
after three weeks, earning it the title of the Short Parliament." ' He then em-
barked on another campaign against Scotland without parliamentary
support.'6
The army Charles sent against Scotland for the Second Bishops' War was
underfunded, mutinous, poorly armed, and, by the time of the fighting, out of
pay." 7 Facing such a force, the Scots attacked into England. On August 28,
1640, they won the Battle of Newburn and then captured an undefended
Newcastle and its London coal trade." The fighting ended with an agree-
ment that required England to pay £850 a day for the Scottish army's keep
until a permanent settlement was reached." 9 This agreement also left the
Scottish army in possession of some English counties as security for the
payment.1 20
Without a parliamentary grant, Charles could not pay the Scots, "and if
he failed to keep his engagements and they elected to march on London,
there was no armed force strong enough to stop them."'' Therefore, he had
no choice but to call Parliament into session. Already in a weak position,
Charles lacked the personal and political skills to preserve the Crown's
111. See TANNER, supra note 77, at 83-86. The issues underlying the Bishops' Wars included
imposition on the Scots of a prayer book similar to that of England and church rule by bishops (epi-
scopacy) rather than presbyters. See id. For a history, see MARK CHARLES FISSEL, THE BISHOPS'
WARS: CHARLES I's CAMPAIGNS AGAINST SCOTLAND, 1638-1640 (1994).
112. KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 423; TANNER, supra note 77, at 86-87. This was the first
significant English war since 1399 that had not been brought before Parliament. Caroline M. Hib-
bard, Episcopal warriors in the British wars of religion, in WAR AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 97,
at 164, 164.
113. See TANNER, supra note 77, at 87.
114. KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 423; TANNER, supra note 77, at 87-88.
115. KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 423-24; TANNER, supra note 77, at 88-89.
116. See KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 423-24; TANNER, supra note 77, at 89-90.
117. CONRAD RUSSELL, THE FALL OF THE BRITISH MONARCHIES 1637-1642, at 140-43
(1991); see Hibbard, supra note 112, at 165.
118. See RUSSELL, supra note 117, at 142-45.
119. See KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 424; TANNER, supra note 77, at 90.
120. See KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 424; TANNER, supra note 77, at 90.
121. TANNER, supra note 77, at 92.
122. KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 424; TANNER, supra note 77, at 90.
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financial independence or, ultimately, his own life. 2 Parliament met on
November 3, 1640, and did not dissolve until 1660 (the Long Parliament).124
That twenty-year period saw an Irish Rebellion; two English civil wars; the
execution of Charles I; wars with Scotland, Ireland, the Dutch Republic, and
Spain; the near-dictatorial rule of Oliver Cromwell; and the rise and fall of
both the Commonwealth (1649-53) and the Protectorate (1653-60). 125
In its initial phase, from 1640 until 1642, the Long Parliament showed
that it well understood the source of its political power and took action that
put it more firmly in possession of the purse.126 It enacted legislation that
precluded the King from assessing ship money,22 restored the boundaries of128 •129
the royal forests, outlawed compulsory knighthood, and limited customs
• • 130 ..
duties to those approved by Parliament. With this legislative package,
"[the Long Parliament had now succeeded in preventing [the King] from
obtaining any more money without common consent ... and ... in making
itself indispensable in the State."''
After Cromwell's death in 1658 and a brief period of confusion, the Ca-
valier Parliament of 1660 restored the Stuarts to the throne. Charles II
(1660-85), the son of Charles I, received from Parliament "the royal title,
the royal property, and nominally the royal prerogative."'3 2 In return, he
promised a general amnesty, freedom of religion, security of property ac-
quired during the disturbances, and back pay for the army.'33 In addition, he
acknowledged as valid the parliamentary acts of 1641 and 1642 that, among
other things, had given Parliament the power of the purse.14
For the time, this power remained a limited one. The Cavalier Parliament
still "meant that the king should 'live of his own.' " Parliament did not direct
how Charles II should spend his permanent revenue (the hereditary income
123. See KEIR, supra note 62, at 158-59; L.J. REEVE, CHARLES I AND THE ROAD TO PER-
SONAL RULE 173-77 (1989).
124. KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 424.
125. KEIR, supra note 62, at 208-09; KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 419-41.
126. See TANNER, supra note 77, at 98-99.
127. 16 Car., c. 14 (1641).
128. 16 Car., c. 16 (1641).
129. 16 Car., c. 20 (1641).
130. 16 Car., c. 36 (1642).
131. TANNER, supra note 77, at 99. Yet, the control Parliament had won over the purse would
lay dormant for years. Under Cromwell, Parliament exercised little influence over expenditures
because he "effectively controlled the 'controllers.'" EINZIG, supra note 62, at 83. Likewise, in
matters of taxation the Lord Protector had more authority than any of Britain's monarchs. See id. at
62.
132. KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 442.
133. See id.
134. See KEtR, supra note 62, at 230; KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 440; TANNER, supra note
77, at 214-15.
135. Clayton Roberts, The Constitutional Significance of the Financial Settlement of 1690, 20
Hisr. J. 59, 70 (1977).
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and lifetime grants). 136 And with some exceptions,1 7 it did not direct how the
Crown should spend the temporary supplies it granted.
Nevertheless, Parliament's changes in the terms under which Charles II
was to "live of his own" created a new arrangement whose full implications
would be realized thirty years later. In 1660 Parliament abolished the last of
the feudal incidents that produced revenue for the Crown.' Parliament re-
placed this ancient hereditary revenue with a hereditary grant of excise
duties; 9 then, it replaced the remainder of the Crown's revenue with other
excise duties and with customs duties that it bestowed on Charles II for
life.' 40 With Charles's acquiescence to this financial settlement, which was
estimated at £1,200,000 per year, 14 Parliament "possessed an indisputable
sovereignty in legislation and taxation."' 42 For now, however, "the disburse-
ment of revenue was still within the domain of Prerogative.' 43
For a number of reasons-among them, that he was a man "who liked
his fun, thought Puritanism no religion for a gentleman, and acted accord-
ingly"'4"--Charles II was unable to govern on his revenue and ofteni. 145
requested additional supplies from Parliament. Parliament typically con-
trolled Charles's expenditures by keeping the supplies inadequate rather
136. See id. at 70, 72 (noting that the Convention Parliament of 1690, which was less willing
to allow the King to "live of his own" than the Cavalier Parliament, was nonetheless "content" to
leave "the executive machinery of state .... with the king"); cf I BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at
*271, *296 (describing the Crown's ordinary revenue as its "fiscal prerogatives" and the "proper
patrimony of the crown").
137. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Such revenues had been shrinking for centu-
ries. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *295-96; TANNER, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS, supra
note 84, at 345.
139. 12 Car. 2, c. 24 (1660). This excise grant was "hereditary" in the same sense as the old
hereditary revenue had been: it was a perpetual grant regarded as the Crown's own money and was
available to the next King or Queen who acceded to the throne without any settlement by Parliament.
See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *271-96.
140. See 8 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 1660-1714, at 274 (Andrew Browning ed.,
1953). The statute that bestowed customs duties is sometimes called the Great Statute. id. at 274,
289. For the text of the Great Statute, see 12 Car. 2, c. 4 (1660).
141. See EINZIG, supra note 62, at 83. Parliament chose this amount after a committee deter-
mined that the annual expenditures of Charles I from 1637 to 1641 were £1,095,000. See 8 H.C.
JOUR. 150 (1660). The estimate of the value of the excise and customs revenues was optimistic and
never approached £1,200,000. To make up the difference, Parliament added an unpopular hearth tax
to the Crown's hereditary revenue. 14 Car. 2, c. 10 (1662); 8 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS
1660-1714, supra note 140, at 274; E.A. Reitan, From Revenue to Civil List, 1689-1702: The Revo-
lution Settlement and the 'Mixed and Balanced' Constitution, 13 HIST. J. 571, 571 (1970). When
William 11 renounced the hearth tax in a message to the House of Commons in 1689, see 10 H.C.
JOUR. 38 (1689), that portion of the revenue became available to future monarchs.
142. KEIR, supra note 62, at 231.
143. Id. at 236.
144. KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 443-44.
145. See, for example, Charles n's speech to the House of Commons on June 12, 1663. 8
H.C. JOUR. 500 (1663). In the 1670s Charles discovered a new source of revenue: secret payments
from Louis X7V in return for his agreement to follow France's lead on certain matters. See Clyde L.
Grose, Louis XIV's Financial Relations with Charles 1! and the English Parliament, I J. MODERN
HIST. 177 (1929).
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than specifying the authorized uses of the money. 46 In 1665, however, when
it granted a supply for a war against Holland, Parliament included an appro-
priation clause that required the entire sum to be spent on the war.'47
As a result of his ongoing financial difficulties, Charles resorted to
mortgaging the realm's future. Charles obtained loans from numerous finan-
ciers against his promise to repay them out of the revenue for future years.
In 1667, to forestall these financiers' demands for immediate repayment,
Charles issued a proclamation under which "his Majesty [would] hold firm
and sacred" his "inviolable" obligations to repay these loans. 14 He ordered
the Chancellor, Treasurer, and officials in the Exchequer to "observe the
same, as they [would] be answerable to his Majesty at their utmost perils."' 49
After making good for five years, however, Charles's desperate need for
money to finance a war with Holland led him to order a "stop" on the
Exchequer-a suspension of payments to the bankers.'- The matter was
resolved in 1677, when Charles granted the bankers annuities paying six
percent per annum in perpetuity,' ' to be paid out of the hereditary excise
that Parliament had granted."' But the Crown again stopped payment in
146. See EINZIG, supra note 62, at 83.
147. 18 & 19 Car. 2, c. 1, § 33 (1666); MAITLAND, supra note 70, at 433; see EINZIG, supra
note 62, at 84; KEIR, supra note 62, at 249. Parliament included similar appropriation clauses in a
number of subsequent grants. See EINZIG, supra note 62, at 84; MAITLAND, supra note 70, at 310,
433. During the reign of Charles Ithe two Houses of Parliament clashed over which controlled the
purse. See EINZIG, supra note 62, at 113-14; MAITLAND, supra note 70, at 310-11. In 1662, over
the protest of some of the lords, the House of Commons refused to permit the House of Lords to
amend a bill raising revenue, claiming that the sole power lay in the Commons. See 11 H.L. JOUR.
469 (1662). Thereafter the Commons continued to assert its privilege to originate tax and appropria-
tions bills and to deny the Lords the power to amend them. This resolution of the Commons was
typical:
Resolved, &c. That all Aids and Supplies, and Aids to His Majesty in Parliament, are the sole
Gift of the Commons: And all Bills for the Granting of any such Aids and Supplies ought to
begin with the Commons: And that it is the undoubted and sole Right of the Commons, to di-
rect, limit and, appoint, in such Bills, the Ends, Purposes, Considerations, Conditions,
Limitations, and Qualifications of such Grants; which ought not to be changed, or altered by
the House of Lords.
9 H.C. JOUR. 509 (1678). The House of Lords finally acquiesced on the point in 1701. See EiNZIG,
supra note 62, at 113-14; MAITLAND, supra note 70, at 310-11. "Thus the House of Commons
became in practical power the superior of the two houses." MAITLAND, supra note 70, at 311.
148. Proclamation declaring the inviolability of the Exchequer (June 18, 1667), reprinted in 8
ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 1660-1714, supra note 140, at 350, 351.
149. Id.
150. The stop occurred either in late 1671, see 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 32; Bankers'
Case, supra note 17, at 2, or early 1672, see J. Keith Horsefield, The "Stop of the Exchequer" Revis-
ited, 35 ECON. HIST. REv. 511, 512 (1982). The proclamation announcing the stop was published on
January 6, 1672. See Proclamation announcing the stop of the Exchequer (Jan. 4-8, 1672), reprinted
in 8 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 1660-1714, supra note 140, at 352. Charles H continued to
repay debts other than those of the bankers. See William A. Shaw, Introduction to 3 CALENDAR OF
TREASURY BOOKS pt. 1, at vii, xxv-xxx (William A. Shaw ed., 1908).
151. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 33; Shaw, supra note 150, at xlvii-xlix. The annui-
ties cost Charles approximately £78,900 per year, see Shaw, supra note 150, at xlviii, or roughly 6.5
percent of the £1,200,000 on which he was expected to govern.
152. On the grant of the hereditary excise, see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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1683, and payments remained in arrears when the Bankers' Case com-
menced in 1690.153
3. Finance After the Stuarts
With the Bankers' Case, the questions of parliamentary supremacy, fis-
cal policy, and sovereign immunity collided. Before we examine that case,
however, it is necessary to relate briefly the political and fiscal history of
the rest of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. When James 11 (1685-
88) came to the throne, his hereditary revenue, plus the lifetime revenue
granted on his accession, amounted to £1,500,000 per year; Parliament
then granted James further revenues for a term of years that brought his
income above £1,900,000-an amount that was sufficient, in James's fru-
gal hands, to make the Crown financially independent of Parliament.1
4
Both temperamentally and philosophically an absolute monarchist, James
II made swift use of his independence, using the prerogatives of his office to
promote Roman Catholicism in England. 5 5 In 1688, resentment over this
and other actions'56 led seven peers, representing both parties of Parliament
and a broad coalition of English society, to invite William of Orange, the
Dutch husband of James's Protestant daughter Mary, to bring an armed
force to England. 5 7 After his army deserted, James abdicated and fled the
country. 51 In 1690, Sir Edward Seymour observed that "from such easy
concessions" by Parliament of the revenue "came our miseries.' 5 9
Parliament never made the same mistake again. An adequate revenue
was, in the words of the Lord Treasurer for Charles II, "the sinewes of the
monarchy";' 6' or, as Sir Joseph Williamson observed more prosaically in
1690, "when Princes have not needed Money, they have not needed us.",'
6
'
153. See Bankers' Case, supra note 17, at 107. Professor Horsefield states that the bankers
received three quarterly payments during the reign of James 11, Horsefield, supra note 150, at 517,
but at least one banker denied receipt of any payments after 1683, see Bankers' Case, supra note 17,
at 107.
154. See Robert Howard, Report to the House of Commons (Mar. 1, 1689), in 10 H.C. JOUR.
37-38 (1689); Roberts, supra note 135, at 64, 71-72.
155. See MAITLAND, supra note 70, at 312; TANNER, supra note 77, at 203.
156. Among other sources of friction were James's manipulation of boroughs to ensure a
subservient Parliament, his collection of taxes that Parliament had granted to Charles II but not to
him, and his decision to keep a standing army of 16,000 soldiers without Parliament's consent, See
MAITLAND, supra note 70, at 291, 309, 328.
157. See TANNER, supra note 77, at 260-61.
158. KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 446-48.
159. 10 DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 1667-94, at 13-14 (Anchitell Grey ed.,
London, D. Henry, R. Cave, & J. Emonson 1763) [hereinafter GREY'S DEBATES] (remarks of Ed-
ward Seymour on Mar. 27, 1690).
160. Memorandum of Thomas Osborne, Lord Treasurer, to Charles II (Mar. 17, 1674), in 2
ANDREW BROWNING, THOMAS OSBORNE: EARL OF DANBY AND DUKE OF LEEDS 1632-1712, at 64,
65 (1944).
161. 10 GREY'S DEBATES, supra note 159, at 11 (remarks of Joseph Williamson on Mar. 27,
1690).
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Thus, the Convention Parliament 16l settled on William and Mary (1689-
1694 as joint rulers; 1694-1702 for William III as sole ruler) a revenue of
roughly £1,200,000 per year. Specifically, it provided hereditary and ex-
cise revenue of £690,000 granted for life, and £577,000 in customs
revenue for a four-year period. 63 Not only was this sum grossly inade-
quate,' 6 but limiting nearly half the revenue to a four-year grant also
created a recurring need for the Crown to call Parliament into session. And
this was precisely the point: Parliament recognized that starving the
Crown for revenue was the only way in which it could incline the Crown
against corrupt ministers or secure the passage of legislation.' 6' As Sir
Thomas Clarges observed, "[T]his House hath nothing to get a good bill
passed but their money, which when they have once parted with they have
no great power."' 66
By laying an axe to the ancient root that the King should "live of his
own," Parliament carved a new constitutional order as the seventeenth cen-
tury ended. 61 In this order, "the question of finance was crucial, for
Parliament saw in control of finance the most effective instrument to limit
the power of the Crown, while the Crown insisted that monarchy could not
maintain its proper place in the constitution without some degree of fiscal
independence."6 The financial settlement on William and Mary "had
taken the first steps in the establishment of parliamentary supremacy in
finance."' 69 William III still resisted Parliament's efforts to encumber or to
direct the expenditure of his hereditary revenue, on the principle that the
money was his to spend as he pleased. 70 But William gave other financial
162. The Convention Parliament, which was called to constitute a government after James's
abdication, was so named because James had thrown the Great Seal into the Thames and without it
"the King's name could not be used on the summonses." KNAPPEN, supra note 82, at 448.
163. Roberts, supra note 135, at 62.
164. Professor Roberts estimates that the grant of £1,200,000 was £200,000-£300,000 less
than the expenses that William and Mary faced and that, in addition, another £200,00-including
almost £80,000 due the financiers in the Bankers' Case-was encumbered to service the interest on
past debts. Id. at 64-65. Parliament picked "the time-honoured sum of £1,200,000" without regard
to the actual needs of the Crown but rather with an eye to ensuring that the Crown would not be-
come financially independent. See Reitan, supra note 141, at 578; Roberts, supra note 135, at 70.
165. Roberts, supra note 135, at 72-73.
166. THE PARLIAMENTARY DIARY OF NARCISSUS LUTTRELL 1691-93, at 193 (Henry Horwitz
ed., 1972) [hereinafter PARLIAMENTARY DIARY] (remarks of Thomas Clarges on Feb. 18, 1692).
167. See KEIR, supra note 62, at 275-77; Reitan, supra note 141, at 571; Roberts, supra note
135, at 65.
168. Reitan, supra note 141, at 571; see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *323-26 (arguing
that the Crown's revenue was the source of its independence from Parliament).
169. Reitan, supra note 14 1, at 580. Even after its power of the purse was secured, Parliament
did not grasp firm political control until the nineteenth century. Indeed, it remained largely indiffer-
ent to the details of the Crown's civil administration and to military affairs during much of the
eighteenth century. See EINZIG, supra note 62, at 117-21, 130; HENRY ROSEVEARE, THE TREASURY:
THE EVOLUTION OF A BRITISH INSTITUTION 86-91 (1969). For example, in 1706, Parliament ceded
to the Crown one of its central fiscal powers: the right to initiate requests for expenditure. EINZIG,
supra note 62, at 130.
170. See Reitan, supra note 141, at 587-88; Roberts, supra note 135, at 62.
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ground to Parliament, "sacrific[ing] the principle of an independent Reve-
nue" in return for money to finance "his purpose in life": his great war
with France." ' By the mid-1690s, the Crown and Parliament had reached a
detente that separated the supply for military expenditures from that for
civil expenditures."' In 1698, Parliament granted William lifetime reve-
nues, estimated at £700,000, to be spent on the "civil list," which was the
money that maintained the royal household and the civil government. 73 At
the same time, it assumed responsibility for the national debt and for
funding the military-moves that further increased its power and estab-
lished a new relationship between private and public capital markets.'74
The Glorious Revolution had ushered in a "Financial Revolution" that si-
multaneously stabilized (and drove down the cost of) government
borrowing and altered the constitutional landscape forever. 5
In the end, even the civil list, which Blackstone extolled as a principal
bulwark maintaining the Crown's "constitutional independence,' ' 76 gave
way to Parliament's control. Led by Edmund Burke, Parliament brought
the civil list within its ambit in 1782 by limiting the Crown's prerogative
to spend from the list. 7 After this legislation, civil expenditures were
largely handled in the same fashion as military expenditures. Ministers
of the government were subject to questioning about expenditures in
Parliament. 79 Burke's act had "destroyed another of the few remaining
vestiges of an independent executive power in the Crown.... The eight-
eenth-century tension between the conflicting principles of parliamentary
supremacy and an independent financial provision for the Crown had been
resolved-as it had to be-in favour of parliamentary supremacy."
' '
8
s
171. Reitan, supra note 141, at 582.
172. Id. at 582-84.
173. Civil List Act, 1698, 9 Will. 3, c. 23.
174. See E.A. Reitan, The Civil List in Eighteenth-Century British Politics: Parliamentary
Supremacy versus the Independence of the Crown, 9 HisTr. J. 318, 318-19 (1966). In 1695
Parliament created the Bank of England, using it to issue negotiable Exchequer bills that financed
the government. KEIR, supra note 62, at 275.
175. See North & Weingast, supra note 83, at 808-17. Professors North and Weingast use the
term "Fiscal Revolution," id. at 819, although others use the term "Financial Revolution," e.g.,
HENRY RoSEVEARE, THE FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 1660-1760 (1991). But see Stephen Quinn, The
Glorious Revolution's Effect on English Private Finance: A Microhistory, 1680-1705, 61 J. ECON.
HIST. 593 (2001) (critiquing the thesis of North and Weingast and arguing that the Glorious Revolu-
tion's political settlement raised rates on private debt).
176. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *323. See generally id. at *319-23 (describing the rise
and significance of the civil list). Although not mentioned by Blackstone, one of the significant
aspects of the civil list in practice was that it provided the Crown with a bankroll with which it
might buy influence in Parliament. See Reitan, supra note 174, at 321-22.
177. See Civil Establishment Act, 1782, 22 Geo. 3, c. 82, § 24; EINZIG, supra note 62, at 164-
65.
178. EINZIG, supra note 62, at 165.
179. Id.
180. Reitan, supra note 174, at 337.
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C. The Bankers' Case and Its Aftermath
With this context, the significance of the Bankers' Case may be fully
appreciated. The Bankers' Case arose out of the loans given to Charles II
in 1667 to finance his government.'' By 1677, when the debt was renego-
tiated, the unpaid principal and accrued interest was nearly £1,315,000. 1
2
Because Parliament had not yet assumed responsibility for financing the
debt, 1 3 any debts that Charles incurred on behalf of the government were
very much a personal-not Parliament's-obligation. 4 Desperately short
of cash, Charles provided the bankers with annuities paying six percent per
annum in perpetuity, to be paid out of the hereditary excise that Parliament
had granted him."' In retrospect, this scheme constituted "the first ...
'funding' operation in English history" and blazed the way for the eventual
116creation of a national debt funded by tax revenues.
Charles fell behind on payments again in 1683, but the bankers 87 de-
layed their lawsuit for years. They first petitioned Parliament for payment
188 8in 1689. Parliament never acted.8 9
As a result, the financiers brought an action in the Court of Exchequer,
seeking a writ ordering the barons of the Exchequer to pay the amounts due
on the annuities.'9 Legally, the case presented two critical issues.'9' The first
181. See supra notes 148-153 and accompanying text.
182. See Shaw, supra note 150, at xlviii.
183. The idea and utility of a national debt serviced out of tax revenues developed after the
Glorious Revolution in 1688. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *315-18; HARVEY E. FISK,
ENGLISH PUBLIC FINANCE FROM THE REVOLUTION OF 1688, at 75, 86-87 (1920); North & Wein-
gast, supra note 83, at 823; supra notes 154-174 and accompanying text.
184. See FIsK, supra note 183, at 75-76; PARLIAMENTARY DIARY, supra note 166, at 123
(remarks of Charles Sedley on Jan. 12, 1692); Shaw, supra note 150, at xxxi-xxxiii (criticizing
Parliament's "iniquitous and disgraceful" refusal to address Charles nt's debt).
185. See supra notes 151-152 and accompanying text. Because they had lent money on the
strength of Charles's promise to repay, the bankers were understandably reluctant to accept a promise
of repayment from Charles's lifetime revenue, which was always a heartbeat away from drying up.
186. ROSEVEARE, supra note 169, at 69 & n.
187. There were twenty-five financiers in total, three of whom were owed more than
£960,000. Shaw, supra note 150, at xlviii. Six were described as "goldsmiths," id., who were the
prototypes of modem bankers, PLUCKNETT, supra note 21, at 58. To make the loans, some of the
financiers borrowed from others or used assets on deposit; in turn, some assigned the annuity in-
come to their depositers or to others. Bankers' Case, supra note 17, at 106-07; Bruce G. Carruthers,
Politics, Popery, and Property: A Comment on North and Weingast, 50 J. ECON. HIsT. 693, 694 n.9
(1990). One estimate put the number of creditors affected by Charles's default on the annuities at
more than 10,000. Bankers'Case, supra note 17, at 2-3.
188. See Horsefield, supra note 150, at 518; Reitan, supra note 141, at 578.
189. Horsefield, supra note 150, at 518. As late as January 1692, the bankers were still trying
to strike a deal with the Commons for payment. See 10 H.C. JOUR. 631-32 (1692).
190. Bankers' Case, supra note 17, at 24, 43. According to Comberbach's report, the case
began when the financiers presented to the Exchequer the letters patent that Charles 1I had given
them. The report gives "Hillary-term, I Will. & Mar." as the date of the presentation. R v. Homby,
Comberbach 270, 90 Eng. Rep. 472, 472 (Exch. Chamber 1694). That date places the filing as some
time early in 1690. Professor Horsefield gives the filing date as January 1691. Horsefield, supra
note 150, at 518.
191. In the Exchequer Chamber, Lord Chief Justice Treby argued a third issue: defects in the
judgment that the Court of Exchequer had entered. Bankers' Case, supra note 17, at 23-24. In their
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was whether Charles II could alienate his hereditary revenue-in other
words, whether his grant of annuities was legally binding on successors to
the throne." Assuming that the alienation was proper, the second issue was
whether a petition to the barons was the proper procedure for obtaining re-
lief.'93
Despite the technicality and dryness of these issues, the case attracted
great attention. 94 Lord Chief Justice Holt thought that the first issue was
"the great point of the case."' 95 Lord Somers described the first issue as "a
subject of the highest importance" and the second as "a point of as great
moment as ever came to be discussed in Westminster-hall."'' 96 The case at-
tracted attention, in part, because of the number of affected individuals
97
and the amount of money at stake.19 8 But another reason for its salience was
its effect on the nascent systems of professional banking and government
finance. 99 Although acknowledging these concerns, Somers disclaimed
them as the true reasons for the case's significance. Instead, he said, the case
mattered so greatly "because it does in so high a degree concern the gov-
ernment, and disposal of the public revenue, and the treasure of the Crown;
whereof the law has always had a superlative care, as that upon which the
safety of the king and kingdom must, in all ages, depend."
2°°
201
The Attorney General demurred generally to the petition, 2° and in 1692,
the Court of Exchequer held for the bankers. °2 Three barons 3 found that
opinions in the Exchequer Chamber, Lord Chief Justice Holt and Lord Keeper Somers passed over
this argument, see id. at 29, 42-43, although Holt mentioned briefly that any defects could and
should be corrected, id. at 38.
192. Id. at 6, 23, 29, 42.
193. Id.
194. The Bankers' Case is a staple in English legal histories. See, e.g., 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 5, at 32-45; PLUCKNETT, supra note 21, at 704 ("The most important case [Somers] decided
was the Bankers' Case ... ").
195. Bankers'Case, supra note 17, at 29.
196. Id. at 43.
197. See supra note 187.
198. According to Lord Somers's opinion in 1696, the amount at stake was £42,385. Bankers'
Case, supra note 17, at 43. There is no explanation of the difference between this amount and
£78,900, the amount of the annuities granted in 1677. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
199. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 21, at 58-59; North & Weingast, supra note 83, at 824-25
(dating the beginnings of private capital markets in England to the early eighteenth century); supra
note 174 (discussing the creation of the Bank of England).
200. Bankers' Case, supra note 17, at 43.
201. Id. at 8.
202. In re Hornbee, 1 Freeman 331, 89 Eng. Rep. 246 (Exch. 1692).
203. According to Freeman's report, the three were Chief Baron Atkyns and Barons Turton
and Powell. See id. Freeman renders Atkyns's name as "Atkins." Chief Baron Atkyns gave his opin-
ion on February 6, 1692, eight days after Letchmere and the other two barons had given theirs. 2
NARCIssus LUTTRELL, A BRIEF HISTORICAL RELATION OF STATE AFFAIRS FROM SEPTEMBER 1678
"to APRIL 1714, at 347-48, 351-52 (London, Univ. Press 1857). The principal opinion was delivered
by Turton and Powell; Dodd's report indicated that Atkyn's opinion "concurred with Powell and
Turton for the petitioners and in all things against the king." DOoD'S REPORTS, supra note 17, at 114.
May 2009]
1232 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 107:1207
Charles's grant was "good to bind the successor, so as to continue a charge
upon the said revenue,' '" 20 that "the remedy by petition to the Barons was a
proper remedy, and that it was in their power to relieve the petitioners, and
give judgment for them."205 Baron Letchmere dissented on the first (and, for
him, dispositive) issue, arguing that "the King could not alien or charge this
revenue.
' '
"
20
The Attorney General then brought a writ of error in the Exchequer
207 
. 208Chamber, a court that served several functions and heard claims of error
from the common-law courts.w The stature of three of the judges whose
opinions in the Exchequer Chamber have survived-George Treby, the Lord
Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas;2 0 John Holt, the Lord Chief
Justice; 21 and John Somers, the Lord Keeper 2'-gives further proof of the
204. Hornbee, 89 Eng. Rep. at 246.
205. Id. at 247.
206. Id. The statute granting the hereditary excise to Charles II stated that the revenue "shall
be paid unto the Kings Majestie His Heires and Successors for ever hereafter." 12 Car. 2, c. 24, § 14
(1660). Letchmere argued that this language-as well as the lack of language such as "'to do there-
with as he pleased,'" which Parliament had used in other grants to the Crown-indicated the
inalienability of the hereditary revenue. Hornbee, 89 Eng. Rep. at 247. It is not clear if Letchmere
joined the other barons on the second issue-whether a petition to the barons was a proper remedy.
Freeman's report states that "[a]ll the Barons held" the remedy to be proper, id. (footnote omitted),
but a footnote in the English Reports questions whether this statement applied to Letchmere, id. at
247 n.(a).
207. Bankers'Case, supra note 17, at 8.
208. See I HOLDSWORTH, supra note 20, at 242-46; PLUCKNETT, supra note 21, at 161-63.
209. The grants of jurisdiction to the Exchequer Chamber can be found in 31 Edw. 3, c. 12
(1357), and 27 Eliz., c. 8 (1585), amended by 31 Eliz., c. 1 (1589). Its proceedings were notoriously
expensive, cumbersome, and slow, see I HOLDSWORTH, supra note 20, at 245, which probably explains
why its decision in the Bankers' Case was not announced until 1696. By statute, the sole judges in the
Exchequer Chamber were the Lord Treasurer and the Lord Chancellor, but they were assisted by the
justices of the Court of Common Pleas, the justices of the King's Bench, and the Chief Baron of the
Exchequer. See M. Hemmant, Introduction to 2 SELECT CASES IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER BEFORE
ALL THE JUSTICES OF ENGLAND xi (M. Hemmant ed., 1948). After 1668, the Lord Keeper was able to
render judgment in the Exchequer Chamber when the offices of Lord Treasurer and Lord Chancellor
were vacant. 19 & 20 Car. 2, c. 2 (1667-68). As the title implies, the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal had
physical custody of the Great Seal of England. The Lord Keeper performed the functions of the Lord
Chancellor when the latter office was vacant, and the powers of the office were equivalent to those of
the Lord Chancellor. But the office was thought to carry less dignity, for its holder was often a com-
moner. See 5 Eliz., c. 18 (1563); 1 LORD CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS
OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 20 (New York, Cockcroft & Co., 7th ed. 1878); R.F.V. HEUSTON,
LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 1885-1940, at xvi (1964).
210. Treby's opinion can be found in Bankers'Case, supra note 17, at 23-29. It was delivered in
June 1695. Thomas v. R, 10 L.R.Q.B. 31, 40 (1874). Judicial ethics were perhaps not what they are
today. Treby was the Attorney General when the Bankers' Case commenced; he filed the demurrer and
argued the Crown's case in the Court of Exchequer. See DODD'S REPORTS, supra note 17, at 104-06; 7
EDWARD Foss, George Treby, in THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND 364, 365 (photo. reprint 2003) (1864);
Bankers'Case, supra note 17, at 107-08.
211. For Holt's opinion, see Bankers' Case, supra note 17, at 29-38. It was delivered on
November 12, 1695. See 3 LUTTRELL, supra note 203, at 549-50. At the time, the Lord Chief Jus-
tice headed the King's Bench. Aside from the Lord Chancellor, he was the highest-ranking judicial
officer in England.
212. For Somers's opinion, see Bankers' Case, supra note 17, at 39-105. It was delivered on
June 23, 1696. See 4 LUTTRELL, supra note 203, at 75-76. A close advisor of William I, Somers had
Appropriations Power & Sovereign Immunity
significance of the case. So does the quality of their arguments. On the
merits, Treby and Somers argued for reversal of the judgment favoring the
bankers, while Holt argued that it should be affirmed. Treby and Holt be-
lieved that Charles II could alienate his hereditary revenue and thus bind his2214
successors,214 but Somers thought it unnecessary to decide the issue."' On
the second issue, Treby argued that the barons of the Exchequer "could not
give" the "very extraordinary" remedy of granting the bankers' petitions for
216payment, but Holt believed that they could."1 7 Holt's argument seized on
prior processes-the petition of right, the monstrans de droit, and the writ of
liberate-as well as several prior cases to argue that the petition was "a very
proper and legal remedy."2 ' In language and logic familiar to every student
of Marbury v. Madison,2 '9 he put the point plainly: "We are all agreed that
they have a right; and if so, then they must have some remedy .... 20
Somers agreed with Treby. His argument, however, was far more sophis-
ticated-indeed, he "distinguished himself by one of the most elaborate
Arguments ever delivered in Westminster-hall. 22' In essence, Somers con-
tended that the proper remedy for the bankers was a petition of right to the
Crown, not a petition to the barons of the Exchequer, for the barons had no
independent authority to grant relief. Extensively tracing remedies against
the Crown through history, Somers showed that the cases on which Holt
relied had arisen under particular statutory remedies that Parliament hadS 222
authorized in lieu of the petition of right. Because no such statute covered
the bankers' situation, he argued, their only recourse was to the ancient peti-
tion of right. 3
held the title of Lord Keeper since 1693. See 7 EDWARD Foss, John Somers, in THE JUDGES OF
ENGLAND, supra note 210, at 348. Before becoming Lord Keeper, Somers had been Solicitor General
for England from 1689 to 1692 and Attorney General from 1692 to 1693 (in both cases succeeding
Treby in office). Thus, he too was involved in the arguments on the Bankers' Case in the Court of
Exchequer. See Thomas, 10 L.R.Q.B. at 40; DODD'S REPORTS, supra note 17, at 103; Bankers' Case,
supra note 17, at 107-08.
213. Aside from the separate opinions of Treby, Holt, and Somers, a report of the joint opinion of
justices of the King's Bench also exists. R v. Homby, Comberbach 270, 90 Eng. Rep. 472 (Exch.
Chamber 1694).
214. See Bankers'Case, supra note 17, at 23, 29-34.
215. Id. at43.
216. Id. at 23.
217. Id. at 37-38.
218. Id. at 34.
219. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
220. Bankers'Case, supra note 17, at 34.
221. id. at 3. Somers reportedly spent hundreds of pounds collecting books and materials for
his argument. Id. at 39 n.
222. Id. at 42-105.
223. Somers closed his opinion with the observation that the Crown would grant such peti-
tions if they were sought. Id. at 105 ("It must be presumed the crown will pay its just debts."). Given
this concession, Professor Desan has argued that the principle Somers tried to preserve was the
discretion of Treasury officials to decide how to order payments to creditors, especially during a
period of war like the 1690s. Christine A. Desan, Remaking Constitutional Tradition at the Margin
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Somers had the better of the legal merits. 22 But he faced a significant
obstacle. As he acknowledged, "much the greater part of my lords the
judges" of the Exchequer Chamber had "delivered their opinions for the
affirmance" of the barons' judgment.2 5 Somers asked for the opinions of "all
the Judges of England" (including the barons) 226 regarding whether the Lord
Chancellor and Lord Treasurer (which, under the circumstances, meant
Somers alone 1 7) were bound to accept the majority's opinion.12 Holt then
polled the judges and reported that, by a vote of seven to three, Somers (as
Lord Keeper) was "at liberty to give judgment according to his own" opin-
ion.229 Somers concurred in this view, and reversed the judgment in favor of• • ,,210
the bankers "meerly [sic] upon his own opinion.
The bankers then brought a writ of error to the House of Lords. On
January 23, 1700, after two days of argument.. and with eleven lords
dissenting, the House of Lords reversed Somers's judgment in the Exchequer
Chamber.232
On the surface, the Bankers' Case provides unequivocal support for
those who argue that sovereign immunity did not exist in England in the
years before the American Revolution. The affirmative answer given to the
second issue in the case-whether a petition to the barons was a proper pro-
cedure-seems dispositive on the point. Indeed, even Somers admitted that
some remedy existed when the Crown failed to keep its contracts.
A deeper examination of the case and its aftermath, however, points to
the opposite conclusion. The reason relates to the oft-overlooked first issue
of the Empire: The Creation of Legislative Adjudication in Colonial New York, 16 LAW & HIST. REV.
257,271-72 (1998).
224. Even Holdsworth, no fan of sovereign immunity, acknowledged that "[pirobably Lord
Somers was right in the explanation which he gave of [the] cases." 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at
35. Unsurprisingly, however, some accused Somers of allowing politics to enter into his decision.
Horsefield, supra note 150, at 520.
225. Bankers' Case, supra note 17, at 105; see also R v. Homely & Williams, Carthew 388,
90 Eng. Rep. 825, 826 (Exch. Chamber 1696). Somers never gave the exact number of justices in
the majority. According to Comberbach, however, the justices of the King's Bench unanimously
favored affirmance, "and so did all the other justices in their several arguments, as I was informed,
except Treby," R v. Hornby, Comberbach 270, 90 Eng. Rep. 472, 473 (Exch. Chamber 1694). The
same unanimity is reported in Narcissus Luttrell's diary. 3 LUTTRELL, supra note 203, at 549.
226. Homely, 90 Eng. Rep. at 826.
227. Because the offices of Lord Chancellor and Lord Treasurer were both vacant in 1696,
Horsefield, supra note 150, at 519, the Lord Keeper was empowered to render judgment alone.
Bankers'Case, supra note 17, at 3.
228. Bankers'Case, supra note 17, at 105.
229. Id.; see also Homely, 90 Eng. Rep. at 826. Holt was one of the three dissenters.
230. Homely, 90 Eng. Rep. at 826; see Bankers'Case, supra note 17, at 105.
231. Bankers' Case, supra note 17, at 110. As part of the argument, the Lords heard or re-
ceived written reports from each of the judges who had rendered an opinion in the Exchequer
Chamber. Somers and Holt were principal speakers. 4 LUTTRELL, supra note 203, at 606.
232. See Williamson v. Attorney General, 16 H.L. JOUR. 499 (1700). The Journals list 104
lords as being present on that day, but they do not record the number voting in the affirmative. Nor
do they include an opinion for the majority. The dissenters filed a four-paragraph opinion that broke
no new ground. Id. at 499-500.
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that all the judges but Somers resolved: whether the Crown was able to
dispose of its hereditary revenue as it wished. Although all agreed that the
Crown could do so, the Financial Revolution had effectively mooted the
issue for the future. By the time that the Bankers' Case was decided,
Parliament had seized control of the hereditary revenue, substituting lifetime
and annual grants to the Crown in its stead.233
That fact might not seem significant, but events soon proved otherwise.
First, despite the Lords' judgment, virtually none of the bankers received
any compensation from the Exchequer.3 Instead, the game shifted to
Parliament. Over the bankers' protests, the House of Commons fully appro-
priated the Crown's hereditary revenue to other purposes in 1700.23 In 1701,
Parliament enacted legislation to compensate the bankers beginning in 1705,
but it slashed the annuities from Charles H's promised six percent to just
three percent and made them redeemable on the payment of half the princi-
pal. 236 In 1726, Parliament redeemed the annuities by borrowing against the
sinking fund that it had created to reduce the national debt. 21' As these ac-
tions demonstrate, the bankers were dependent upon Parliament for payment
of the government's liability. And Parliament funded this liability as a part
of the ordinary appropriation process.
Second, as part of its effort to control fiscal policy, Parliament put a stop
to the Crown alienation that the judges had blessed in the Bankers' Case. In
1702, in the act that settled a lifetime revenue on Queen Anne (1702-14),
Parliament prevented the Crown from alienating in perpetuity nearly all
Crown lands or estates."' In the same legislation, it also barred the Crown
from alienating the income associated with its traditional hereditary revenue
for "longer than the Life of ... such King or Queen as shall make such
Alienation or Grant.' 2 9 Because lenders would be unlikely to grant loans
233. See supra notes 162-175 and accompanying text.
234. One banker reportedly received two payments from the treasury. See Horsefield, supra
note 150, at 522.
235. Id.
236. 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 12, § 24 (1700-01). The statute charged the payments to the heredi-
tary revenue. Id. The reason that Parliament shaved the interest rate and the repayment of principal
remains a mystery. Professor Horsefield traces the decision to beliefs that the bankers had extorted a
high interest rate from Charles II and that the original debts had been bought up by speculators for
far less than full value. Horsefield, supra note 150, at 518-19, 523. As part of an act establishing the
South Seas Company, Parliament further reduced the interest rate to 2.5 percent in 1716. Compare 3
Geo. 1, c. 7, §§ 12-13 (1716) (stating a 5 percent rate), with 13 Geo. 1, c. 3, § 7 (1726) (noting that
the 5 percent interest was payable only on the moiety, effectively making the rate 2.5 percent).
237. 13 Geo. 1, c. 3, § 7 (1726). Professor Horsefield estimates that, in the final analysis, the
bankers received a poor rate of return (perhaps 1.5%) and even had the principal significantly writ-
ten down. As he understates, "the owners of the debt ... had been hardly done by." Horsefield,
supra note 150, at 523.
238. 1 Ann., c. 1, § 5 (1702). The stated term was either thirty-one years or another term
determinable by "One Two or Three Lives." Id. "Advowsons of Churches and Vicaridges" were
excluded from the prohibition. Id.
239. Id. § 7.
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whose collection depended on a monarch's continued good health, °
Parliament had effectively gained control of the Crown's access to nonap-
propriated funds. Moreover, it had effectively overturned the decision on the
first issue in the Bankers' Case-that a monarch's alienation of revenue
could bind his or her successors-thus ensuring that there would never be
another case like it.
Contrary to common understandings, therefore, the Bankers' Case was
the end of an era in the history of sovereign immunity, not the start. The
eighteenth century contained no further common-law sovereign immunity
• • 241
decisions. Henceforth, settling claims against the government was
ab initio a legislative function, interwoven with Parliament's control over
finance and appropriations.
This sea change is best reflected in the opinion of Lord Mansfield in
• 242
Macbeath v. Haldimand, which has gone virtually unnoticed in debates over
• • 243
sovereign immunity. In Macbeath, a contractor had agreed to provide sup-
plies to or on behalf of the British military during the American Revolution.
He sued the military governor of Quebec for failing to honor portions of the
contracts that the governor thought exorbitant. During its deliberations, the
jury asked the trial judge if the contractor would have any remedy if it found
for the governor. The judge instructed the jury that the existence of other
remedies "was no part of their consideration," but he went on to opine that,
"if the plaintiff's demand were just, his proper remedy was by a petition of
right to the Crown. On which [the jury] found a verdict for the [gover-
nor] .244
240. See EDWARD HUGHES, STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE 1558-1825, at 167
(1934).
241. See Desan, supra note 223, at 276 n.43 ("The development of sovereign immunity doc-
trine in the eighteenth century remains obscure ... "); cf. R v. Powell, I Q.B. 352, 113 Eng. Rep.
1166, 1171 (1841) (stating that the remedies of petition of right, monstrans de droit, and traverse of
office "are now very much out of use," but suggesting in dicta that they would be available). The
Bankers' Case was cited on a few occasions in the eighteenth century for some of its subsidiary
propositions, but never to hold the Crown legally responsible for its actions. See, e.g., R v. Roberts,
2 Strange 1208, 93 Eng. Rep. 1131, 1132 (K.B. 1744); Queensberry & Dover's Case, I P. Wms.
582, 24 Eng. Rep. 527, 530 (H.L. 1719) (appeal taken from Ch.). It was also twice cited by lawyers
in the course of their arguments, but not in cases seeking recovery against the Crown. Nabob of the
Carnatic v. E. India Co., I Ves. Jun. 371, 30 Eng. Rep. 391, 398 (Ch. 1791); Stafford v. Buckley, 2
Ves. Sen. 170, 28 Eng. Rep. 111, 112 (Ch. 1750).
242. 1 T.R. 172,99 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B. 1786).
243. A search of the 'TP-all" database in Westlaw ("macbeath /3 haldimand") on February 25,
2009 revealed only thirteen articles or treatises that cite the case. None of these authorities contains a
significant analysis of Mansfield's sovereign-immunity discussion. Four mention it in passing. See
Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American
Tradition, Ill HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1442 nn.279 & 282 (1998) [hereinafter Desan, The Constitutional
Commitment]; Desan, supra note 223, at 267 n.17, 276 n.43, 277 n.44; Janet McLelan, "Crown Him
with Many Crowns": The Crown and the Treaty of Waitangi, 6 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT'L L. 35, 42 (2008);
Janet McLean, The Crown in Contract and Administrative Law, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 129,
147 n.59 (2004). The remaining nine authorities cite Macbeath for other propositions, such as its
discussion of the right of jury trial.
244. Macbeath, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1038.
1236 [Vol. 107:1207
Appropriations Power & Sovereign Immunity
The plaintiff sought a new trial, alleging both that the defendant was
personally liable and that "the jury had been induced to give their verdict"
by the judge's assertion that a petition of right was available, when in fact
"the plaintiff had no remedy against the Crown by a petition of right. ' 245 The
case ultimately turned on the first point, with the King's Bench unanimously
holding that, on the facts, the agent (the governor) was not personally re-
sponsible for a contract that the principal (the government) had allegedlyb . 246
breached. But Mansfield began his opinion by discussing the second point
in language deserving extended quotation:
His Lordship said, that great difference had arisen since the [Glorious]
Revolution, with respect to the expenditure of the public money. Before
that period, all the public supplies were given to the King, who in his indi-
vidual capacity contracted for all expenses. He alone had the disposition of
the public money. But since that time, the supplies have been appropriated
by Parliament to particular purposes, and now whoever advances money
for the public service trusts to the faith of Parliament.
That according to the tenor of Lord Somers's argument in The Banker's
case, though a petition of right would lie, yet it would probably produce no
effect. No benefit was ever derived from it in The Banker's case; and
Parliament was afterwards obliged to provide a particular fund towards the
payment of those debts. Whether however this alteration in the mode of
distributing the supplies had made any difference in the law upon this sub-
ject, it was unnecessary to determine; at any rate, if there were a recovery
against the Crown, application must be made to Parliament, and it would
come under the head of supplies for the year.24'
Mansfield believed that Parliament's assumption of power over
appropriations had in all probability destroyed the power of courts to grant
relief against the Crown; claimants against the government were required to
submit their claims through the appropriations process.2 4 ' Two points about
Macbeath bear emphasis. First, Macbeath was decided in May 1786, a little
over a year before the Constitutional Convention ensconced the
Appropriations Clause in the U.S. Constitution. Second, Mansfield's
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1040-41.
247. Id. at 1038 (footnotes omitted).
248. In the nineteenth century, the petition of right received a new lease on life when Parlia-
ment enacted the Petition of Right Act, 1860, 23 & 24 Vict., c. 34. The Act allowed people to sue the
Crown as long as their claims "would have been cognizable if the same had been a Matter in dispute
between Subject and Subject." Id. § 1. Section 7 provided that the statute did not expand remedies
against the Crown "in any Case in which he would not have been entitled to such Remedy before the
passing of this Act." Id. § 7. This phrase required courts to decide whether any remedy existed for the
Crown's breach of contract before 1860. in Thomas v. R, 10 L.R.Q.B. 31 (1874), Justice Blackbum
glided over Mansfield's argument in Macbeath with something less than intellectual honesty, holding
that, because a petition of right lay for breach of contract in the Bankers' Case, the breach-of-contract
remedy sought in Thomas was not new and was therefore actionable. See Thomas, 10 L.R.Q.B. at 39-
44. In any event, however, the Petition of Right Act made the payment of judgments subject to Par-
liament's appropriation of funds. 23 & 24 Vict., c. 34, § 14.
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discussion of the fate of the petition of right was soon noted on the
American side of the ocean. 24'
II. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH APPROPRIATIONS
On its face, the Appropriations Clause-"No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law"°-rejects the outcome of the Bankers' Case. The language of the
Clause precludes resort to the type of writ that the bankers sought to draw
211money from the Treasury. It also readily accommodates Mansfield's logic
in Macbeath: just as the fiscal control that Parliament secured in the Finan-
cial Revolution relegated claimants against the English sovereign to
Parliament's appropriations process, so the Appropriations Clause relegates
suitors against the United States to Congress's appropriations process.
In this Part, we examine whether this simple proposition holds true. But
in doing so, we face issues of translation. The sea change in the law of
English sovereign immunity that resulted from Parliament's control of the
fiscal machinery of state lacks a precise parallel in colonial life. American
colonists were so far removed from direct dealings with the Crown that
none, to our knowledge, ever sued the Crown itself."' Moreover, the colonial
governments-against whom colonists might be expected to bring suit-
were proprietorships, charter companies, corporations, or political subdivi-
sions; the rules for suing such entities varied from the rules for suing the
Crown directly.253 Unsurprisingly, therefore, we find in colonial history no
Bankers' Case in miniature, where we can examine how legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial power collided in the intersection of colonial politics and
249. See infra notes 420-422 and accompanying text. Mansfield's opinions were worthy of
considerable weight; he is regarded as "one of the most remarkable of the many great lawyers who
have helped to build up the fabric of modem English law." 12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 477 (1938). Indeed, Holdsworth assesses him as a "sound constitutional lawyer,"
citing as evidence his judgment in Macbeath. Id. at 487.
250. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7.
251. Such writs do not appear to be "Appropriations made by Law." Cf Sidak, supra note 13,
at 1170-72 (arguing that an executive branch decision or regulation can be a "Law" within the
meaning of the Appropriations Clause). Judicial writs are not "Appropriations" within the common
understanding of that term. Moreover, in Article I, the word "Law" refers to legislation Congress
enacts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Finally, the history of the enactment of the Appropriations Clause,
see infra Sections H.A-C, does not suggest that judicial processes fell within the meaning of the
Clause.
252. See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Rein-
terpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (1983). It bears remembering that the common law had
nothing akin to modem public-law litigation, which holds the government accountable for broad
constitutional violations. To sue the Crown successfully, a person needed to point to some immedi-
ate action of the Crown that caused a wrong cognizable within the then-extant forms of action
(principally, what we might regard today as torts and contracts). But the Crown was not thought to
be liable for its torts, see supra notes 44, 58 and accompanying text, and in any event, no monarch
ever directly injured a colonist. Nor, to our knowledge, did any English monarch ever enter into, and
then breach, a contract with a colonist.
253. See I ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DE-
VELOPMENT 2-11 (7th ed. 1991); Gibbons, supra note 252, at 1896-98.
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fiscal authority. We are left at the point of inference-the point that has di-
vided judges and scholars as they have debated the nature of the sovereign-
immunity doctrine, if any, that made its way into the U.S. Constitution.
Although a complete study of sovereign immunity in the American co-
lonies has never been undertaken,M a few pieces of data are well
established. First, the seventeenth-century charters or constitutions of a
number of the colonies contained "sue and be sued" clauses that waived
sovereign immunity.255 Second, the procedural forms for suing the English
sovereign-the petition of right, the monstrans de droit, and the traverse of
office-never made the trip across the ocean. 2 6 Third, in the eighteenth cen-
tury many colonies adjudicated claims against the government in their
legislatures. 7 Fourth, during the Revolutionary War, some state legislatures
developed a process-similar in many ways to the petition of right-by
which claimants dissatisfied with the settlement of their claims could peti-
tion the judicial branch for relief.2 11
In this Part, we add another well known piece of evidence that has thus far
been ignored in the debates over sovereign immunity: namely, the parallel
between the seventeenth-century fiscal battles between Crown and Commons
and the eighteenth-century fiscal battles between royal governors and colonial
assemblies. The colonial battles had precisely the same outcome as their
English predecessors, with the colonial assembly gaining effective hegemony
over the royal governor. We assert that the Appropriations Clause enshrined
this legislative supremacy by vesting the "power of the purse" in Congress.
We then draw the inference-supported by the language in the Federalist
Papers and the ratification debates, and reflected in the subsequent writings
of St. George Tucker and Joseph Story-that the Appropriations Clause
embodied the same congressional control over the national government's
legal obligations that Parliament had achieved in England.
254. For an overview, see Gibbons, supra note 252, at 1896-99. For a detailed treatment of
sovereign immunity in New York, see Desan, supra note 223.
255. Gibbons, supra note 252, at 1896.
256. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 238-39 (1882) (Gray, J., dissenting) ("The English
remedies of petition of right[,] monstrans de droit, and traverse of office, were never introduced into
this country as part of our common law... "); Jaffe, supra note 2, at 19.
257. Lee, 106 U.S. at 239 (Gray, J., dissenting) ("[I]n the American Colonies and States
claims upon the government were commonly made by petition to the legislature.'); Desan, The
Constitutional Commitment, supra note 243, at 1383; Pfander, supra note 6, at 929-32. Professor
Desan indicates that, in New York, the first such claim was settled in 1706, just a few years after the
resolution of the Bankers' Case. See Desan, The Constitutional Commitment, supra note 243, at
1404-08 (describing the political and financial circumstances leading to this legislative settlement).
It is important to note that not all claims submitted for legislative adjudication involved matters that
had ripened to the point of litigation. Rather, submitting a claim to the legislature was part of the
ordinary process for securing payment. See JACK P. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER
HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY IN THE SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONIES 1689-1776, at 53 & n.6, 97 (1963)
[hereinafter GREENE, QUEST]; Pfander, supra note 6, at 932-33. On the more general use of colonial
assemblies as courts, see MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERI-
CAN COLONIES 14-60 (1943).
258. Pfander, supra note 6, at 934-45.
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A. Following the English Example: Colonial Legislatures
and the Control over Appropriations
After the Restoration in 1660, English authorities imposed an English
model upon colonial governments, with governors, councils, and assemblies
taking the roles of the Crown, the House of Lords, and the House of
Commons, respectively."' By 1700 each colony possessed this tripartite
structure of government.' 60 The colonists were well aware that this structure
mirrored the British constitution. 26' "Belief in a fundamental correspondence
between the English constitution and the separate colonial constitutions,
almost an axiom of political thought in eighteenth-century America, had
gained currency rapidly at the end of the seventeenth century.' 262 In particu-
lar, colonists analogized their legislative bodies to Parliament, with their
"lower House[s] possessing powers akin to those won and exercised by the
House of Commons. 263
The assemblies also modeled their actions on the House of Commons.2 6
Colonial representatives had access to the proceedings of the Commons, as
well as to historical collections, Whig literature of the Stuart era, philoso-
265phical works, and parliamentary commentaries and procedural books.
259. See JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN
THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1788, at 30-31
(1986) [hereinafter GREENE, PERIPHERIES]. Sometimes Crown officials indirectly encouraged the
view that the lower houses had the same powers as the Commons. For instance, from 1730 to 1754,
Crown officials sent instructions to North Carolina's Lower House forbidding them from exercising
"'any power or privilege whatsoever which is not allowed by us to the House of Commons or the
members thereof in Great Britain."' 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS
1670-1776, at 113 (Leonard Woods Labaree ed., 1935) [hereinafter ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS]. Like-
wise, Governor Burnet told the Massachusetts House in 1728 that the British Parliaments "have a
just Claim to be a Pattern to the Assemblies in the Plantations." Govemour William Burnet, Speech
to the Massachusetts House of Representatives (July 24, 1728), in 8 JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1727-1729, at 245, 245 (1927). At least one royal official,
however, asserted that Britain would never "suffer those Assemblies to erect themselves into the
power, and authority, of the British House of Commons." The Opinion of the Attorney-General
Pratt, on the several powers of the Council and Assembly of Maryland (n.d.), in OPINIONS OF EMI-
NENT LAWYERS 264, 267 (George Chalmers ed., Burlington, C. Goodrich & Co. 1858).
260. KELLY ET AL., supra note 253, at 24-25, 29-30; CHARLES A. KROMKOWSKI, RECREAT-
ING THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: RULES OF APPORTIONMENT, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1700-1870, at 60-61 (2002).
261. In the eighteenth century three distinct constitutions shaped the development of the colo-
nial legislatures and British-colonial relations: the unwritten British constitution pertaining to the
English government; the imperial constitution, acknowledged but ill-defined, pertaining to relations
between the English government and the colonies; and each colony's separate constitution. GREENE,
PERIPHERIES, supra note 259, at 67-68; KROMKOWSKI, supra note 260, at 54-61.
262. BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 60 (1968).
263. JOHN F. BURNS, CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN ROYAL GOVERNORS AND THEIR ASSEMBLIES
IN THE NORTHERN AMERICAN COLONIES 14 (1923).
264. See JACK P. GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL POLITICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 194-95 (1994) [hereinafter GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES].
265. Id. Professor Greene observes that the colonials had access to the works of "Henry
Neville, Algernon Sydney, and John Locke (each of which carefully defined the functions of the
House and elaborated the proper relationship between prerogative and Parliament)." Id. at 195. See
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From these sources they learned about managing elections, appointing offi-
cers, and the myriad details of running a legislative body. 66 Equally
significant, these sources taught the colonists the "institutional imperatives
for representative bodies" and provided "a concrete program of political
,,267
action.
Many colonial leaders-whose families often had emigrated to America
during the reigns of the Stuarts--continued to see the political world
through the lens of the seventeenth century struggle between the Crown and
Parliament long after that conflict had lost salience in England itself. 61 In
large measure, their adherence to this old model was appropriate. Although
the relationship between the metropolitan government in London and the
colonies was never completely resolved, and although the metropolitan
government encouraged the development of representative assemblies to aS270
point, neither the Crown nor the colonial governors ever accepted the no-
tion-which colonists widely shared27'-that colonists enjoyed all the rights
272
of those on English soil, including those secured in the Glorious Revolution.
English officials saw the colonies as "creations of the king," and saw their
,,271
constitutional development as "wholly dependent on royal authorization.
English officials further maintained that the colonial assemblies existed only
by grace and sufferance; that they did not have the standing of the Commons;
and that they were temporary, subordinate agencies with limited lawmaking
274
authority rather than legitimate, organic sources of power. Moreover, gov-
ernors enjoyed certain powers that the Crown did not.275 Some tried to rule
generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 23-54
(1967) (discussing the range of literature that influenced Revolutionary-era leaders).
266. GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 196.
267. Id. at 197.
268. See BAILYN, supra note 265, at 53-54; BURNS, supra note 263, at 14-15; GREENE,
NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 189-207.
269. See supra note 261; GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 259, at 76 ("[Tlhe authority of the
assemblies in the peripheries vis-h-vis that of the crown and the Parliament at the center remained in
an uncertain state as late as the 1760s."); supra notes 259, 264 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 259.
271. See GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 259, at 67; KELLY ET AL., supra note 253, at 30.
272. GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 34; KELLY ET AL., supra note
253, at 26 ("The English denied that the principles of the Glorious Revolution applied to the colo-
nies. The colonists insisted that they did .... "). Whatever the difference in view, political dynamics
after the Glorious Revolution favored greater rather than lesser colonial power. See GREENE, NEGO-
TIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 78-92.
273. KROMKOWSKI, supra note 260, at 66; see GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 259, at 32-
35, 43 (noting the Crown's position that it exercised a greater power in the colonies than in Eng-
land).
274. See GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 34-35, 173-74; GREENE,
QUEST, supra note 257, at 15.
275. Governors had the authority to veto legislation, to appoint and dismiss judges, and to sit
alone as courts of equity. Most also had the power to discontinue or dissolve their general assembly
long after the Crown's power to prorogue Parliament had effectively ended. Some governors also
had powers over the election of the speaker of the assembly, church appointments, and fees. See
BAILYN, supra note 262, at 67-69; BURNS, supra note 263, at 16, 27-28; GREENE, NEGOTIATED
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with an absolutism and eye toward private gain that eclipsed, in the eyes of
276
the colonists, the worst of the perceived Stuart excesses.
In this environment, assemblies and governors that engaged in political
confrontations knew how similar events had played out between Commons
and the King, and both sides modeled their actions accordingly.
277
211Assemblies readily saw in each arbitrary, venal, or corrupt governor
another Charles I or James 1I.279 Governors saw the assemblies' opposition to
their programs or to royal instructions "as at least a covert challenge to the
essential prerogatives of the crown or proprietors"28 0 -one that portended a
resurrection of the then-discredited Long Parliament."'
As a result, eighteenth-century America replayed the political drama of
seventeenth-century Stuart England, with its tension between executive as-
sertions of the prerogative and legislative defenses of liberty.282 In particular,
colonists sought to move their own constitutions toward the idealized ver-
sion of the British constitution that had resulted from the Glorious
Revolution: "that is, toward increasing limitations upon prerogative power
and greater security for individual and corporate rights under the protection
of a strong legislature., 283 Even "[a]s the function of representation within
AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 83-84; KELLY ET AL., supra note 253, at 33. Governors' powers
were not, however, absolute; in many ways, governors were weaker than the Crown in England.
They never had "the aura of the concept that the king could do no wrong." GREENE, NEGOTIATED
AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 205. Most found their power to grant patronage to be constricted.
BAILYN, supra note 262, at 74-76; GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 67-69.
Nor did their councils, or upper houses, provide a royally exploitable counterbalance to the assem-
blies, as the Lords did to the Commons. Though usually appointed by the Crown, council members
were not from a hereditary aristocracy (America having none), but from the elite of colonial society.
Thus, council members had backgrounds and interests like those who sat in the lower houses. Un-
derstandably, they often sided with their lower houses against the governor. GREENE, QUEST, supra
note 257, at 12; KELLY ET AL., supra note 253, at 33; see also BAILYN, supra note 265, at 275 (de-
scribing the position of councils in colonial government).
276. See GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 203-05.
277. Id. at 199-202.
278. There were a number of ready examples. See BURNS, supra note 263, at 119 (describing
Massachusetts Governor Belcher's "passion for prestige"); id. at 246 (describing New Hampshire
Governor Cransfield's greed); GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 203-04
(describing colonial impressions of greedy and power-hungry governors). Some governors avoided
conflicts by identifying with the colonial interests, going along with the assemblies, or skillfully
doling out patronage. See GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 67-68; GREENE,
PERIPHERIES, supra note 259, at 47; GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 12. Eventually, efforts by
metropolitan authorities to take away patronage appointments from governors, GREENE, PERIPHER-
IES, supra note 259, at 47, and to force governors to abide by their explicit instructions, GREENE,
NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 73-74, hampered the discretion of governors to han-
dle these confrontations.
279. GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 199-200.
280. Id. at 200.
281. Id. at 201; see also KROMKOWSKI, supra note 260, at 73 (describing eighteenth-century
perceptions of the excesses of the Long Parliament and unrestrained democracy).
282. See GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 197-202.
283. Id. at 39; see also id. at 90 (discussing the colonists' perception of their rights following
the Glorious Revolution). Despite a common reverence for the Glorious Revolution, see BAILYN,
supra note 265, at 45-47, one critical difference that divided colonists from the English was the
colonists' rejection of the view that the Glorious Revolution had established the principle of legisla-
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the British constitution was changing dramatically in the eighteenth century,
the practices and conceptualizations of representation in the American colo-
nies continued to be defined in the customary terms of executive restraint,• / / ,,2814
remedial action, and legislative independence.
The outcome of this replay was essentially the same as that of
seventeenth-century England, with an even more decisive victory for legisla-
tive supremacy. As scholars have often noted, the power and importance of
the colonial assemblies increased dramatically over the course of the eight-
eenth century. Each assembly followed a similar, three-step pattern to
preeminence.2 8 ' Beginning from weakness relative to their governors in the
seventeenth century, colonial assemblies first obtained the power to tax, to
286initiate laws, and to sit independently. Next, in the early eighteenth cen-
tury, they gained the strength to "battle on equal terms with the governors
and councils and challenge even the powers in London if necessary.""2 7 Fi-
nally, by 1763, and in some colonies much earlier, assemblies had achieved
"political dominance" within their colonial governments and held "a posi-
tion to speak for the colonies in the conflict with the imperial government
that ensued after 1763. ' '28s
The path to power was the familiar one that Parliament had blazed in the
seventeenth century: control of the fisc." 9 The Crown's position was that the
colonies could be taxed only by Parliament or with the consent of a colony's
elected house.2 From the early days of colonial administration, the Crown
291had granted taxing authority to the assemblies. Parliament slept on
tive omnipotence. Colonists viewed legislatures as the better protectors of liberty, but they believed
that this liberty constrained legislative power. See id. at 46-47; GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note
259, at 75.
284. KROMKOWSKI, supra note 260, at 84-85. Professor Kromkowski issues a necessary cau-
tionary note about trying to draw broad conclusions regarding political and ideological
commitments from the limited available evidence of the eighteenth century. Id. at 65.
285. GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 3-9; see also KELLY ET AL., supra note 253, at 30-
33 (discussing the development of the power of colonial assemblies at the expense of colonial gov-
emors).
286. GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 4; see also BURNS, supra note 263, at 415-16 (dis-
cussing the development of the power of colonial assemblies, particularly with respect to financial
matters).
287. GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 4.
288. Id. Professor Greene notes that only the lower houses in Maryland and New Hampshire
had failed to achieve political dominance by 1763, but both had done so by 1776. Id. at 7.
289. See BURNS, supra note 263, at 416 (noting that the assemblies' control over Northern
governors "was effected largely by pressure in the matter of finances"); KELLY ET AL., supra note
253, at 31 ("Gaining control over finance was the single most important step in the process.");
LEONARD WOODS LABAREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH COLO-
NIAL SYSTEM BEFORE 1783, at 269 (Frederick Ungar Publ'g Co. 1958) (1930) ("The chief weapon
which [assemblies] used in their contests for supremacy was their power to control finance.").
290. GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 51.
291. See id.; ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 259, at 167-68. Professor Greene dates legis-
lative taxing authority to 1624, when the Virginia legislature claimed it. GREENE, QUEST, supra note
257, at 51. A running dispute in some colonial governments was whether the assembly had the sole
power to initiate revenue bills, or whether that power was shared with the council. In general, the
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whatever taxing power it possessed:292 it did not impose a tax on the colonies
until the 1765 Stamp Act, which precipitated the constitutional crisis that
fueled the American Revolution. 93
"Power to tax was the most important possession of the lower houses,"
294
and they soon translated this power into authority in other areas. As night
follows day, the assemblies asserted the power to appropriate the tax reve-
nues that they collected. 295 Despite having conceded to the assemblies the
power to tax, the Crown resisted the notion that they had any authority over
29629appropriations. But until the 1760s, 297 officials in London never success-
fully imposed their will in the matter.! While governors and imperial
officials repeatedly requested assemblies to establish a permanent revenue-
the equivalent of the hereditary and lifetime revenues of the Crown (or, in
eighteenth-century terms, a civil list299)-their efforts almost universally
failed.30 As a result, governors had no independent capacity to carry out the
imperial government's programs, to pay colonial officials, or to undertake
assemblies were successful in wresting control of this power away from the councils. See id. at 51-
71; cf supra note 147 (describing the comparable struggle between the Commons and the Lords).
292. GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 51.
293. See infra notes 314-319 and accompanying text.
294. GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 51.
295. The impetus to appropriate funds arose from fraudulent behavior by some early gover-
nors, but control over appropriations soon became part and parcel of the assemblies' efforts to
control the government. See BURNS, supra note 263, at 417. Their appropriations function led the
assemblies to undertake the task of handling and adjudicating claims against the colonial govern-
ment. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
296. ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 259, at 170-71; see GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257,
at 87-88.
297. GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 259, at 79-80 (describing the Crown's attempts to
shift the balance of authority away from the colonies, as exemplified by the Stamp Act of 1765).
298. See id. at 44-47. In particular, a hands-off approach in colonial affairs characterized the
long administration of Robert Walpole from 1721 to 1742. Id. at 45-47. The large number of de-
partments and officials with some supervisory responsibility over the colonies made control even
more difficult. KEIR, supra note 62, at 353.
299. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
300. See GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 127; KELLY ET AL., supra note 253, at 32;
ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 259, at 189-94 (providing the instructions sent to Georgia, North
Carolina, and New York that ordered the establishment of a permanent revenue). Only Virginia
provided a permanent revenue to the governor, but the assembly nonetheless succeeded in maintain-
ing significant control over that revenue. See GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 101-04, 127, 130.
Although control over finance was critical as a matter of principle, the amounts of money involved
were small. Colonial government was "lilliputian by modem standards." See GORDON S. WOOD,
THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 61 (1991). The annual budget for South Carolina
shortly before the Revolution was only £8,000; that of the much larger Massachusetts colony, which
employed only six full-time officials, was £25,000. Id. at 82. Major budget items were usually the
salary of the governor and judges, the legislature's expenses, and perhaps the salary of some clergy.
EDWIN J. PERKINS, THE ECONOMY OF COLONIAL AMERICA 190 (2d ed. 1988). Typically, assemblies
appropriated these funds on an annual basis. See BURNS, supra note 263, at 322-27; GERHARD
CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 73 (1997). But see BURNS, supra
note 263, at 68 (noting semi-annual appropriations of salaries in Massachusetts between 1716 and
1722). Annual appropriations required the assemblies to come back into session frequently-a fact
suggesting that the colonists had absorbed another of the lessons in Parliament's long struggle for
power. See supra notes 161-166 and accompanying text.
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colonial administration. 0 ' In fact, some colonial assemblies eventually ob-
tained-and occasionally used-the power to disburse money from the
treasury without the consent of the governor.02
In some colonies, the assemblies had another, particularly effective stick
to brandish: they appropriated the money for the governor's salary. Although,
the Crown set a governor's salary at the time of appointment, it did not typi-
cally fund the salary; the governor relied on an appropriation from the
assembly for his money.03 Unsurprisingly, assemblies sometimes threatened
to withhold (or, in a few famous instances, actually withheld) the salary un-
til the governor acquiesced to the assembly's desires." 4
Although governors and assemblies continued to skirmish throughoutS • 305
the colonial period, with some governors possessing more political muscle
than others, the ultimate outcome was hardly in doubt. 6 With their power
over money secure, the colonial assemblies expanded their authority into
other areas. "As a corollary to their extensive control over finance,'3" 7 as-
semblies issued paper currency; set salaries and fees; appointed revenue
officials, treasurers, and other public officers; controlled public works pro-
jects; provided input on military and Indian affairs; created courts; and
• 308
established terms of office for judges. Assemblies pushed "their authority
301. See KEIR, supra note 62, at 355. An exception is Georgia, for which Parliament appro-
priated funds to meet most expenses of civil government. See GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at
106, 133.
302. See GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 96, 98, 102. Royal officials tried to stop the
practice. See ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 259, at 208-10.
303. See ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 259, at 254-67 (providing examples of royal in-
structions that required an assembly to pay a governor, out of available revenues, a specified salary).
304. See GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 129; KELLY ET AL., supra note 253, at 32; LA-
BAREE, supra note 289, at 312-72. The most famous instance of an assembly withholding a salary
was that of Governor Burnet in Massachusetts. See BURNS, supra note 263, at 76-92; id. at 57 (de-
scribing the Massachusetts assembly's reduction of a governor's salary during a dispute over the
right to veto the assembly's choice of a speaker); id. at 323 (noting a New York governor whose
salary went unpaid for two years in a dispute over the length of appropriations). In the cases of
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, withholding was not an option; London
funded governors' salaries out of duties, quitrents, or appropriations. See GREENE, QUEST, supra
note 257, at 129-47. But see GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 346-47 (not-
ing that in the 1760s South Carolina did not pay its governor's salary during a dispute over an
assembly election).
305. See BURNS, supra note 263, at 417 ("Of all these conflicts, those connected with finances
were by far the most frequent and the most important."); WOOD, supra note 300, at 17 (noting some
"successful strong royal governors" in the middle of the eighteenth century).
306. See KEIR, supra note 62, at 355 ("At every point, indeed, the governor's authority was
circumscribed.").
307. GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 222.
308. For a full discussion of the powers that their control over finance allowed the Southern
assemblies to assume, see id. at 106-25, 148-68, 221-354. See also BURNS, supra note 263, at 26
(noting that, in the Northern colonies, the "control of provincial funds" and appropriations allowed
the assemblies "to obtain nearly all political desiderata," "effectually to hamper the Governor, and
even to venture far into the executive field by encroachments on his military and appointive pow-
ers"). Only in the areas of issuing paper currency and defining the jurisdiction of courts and terms of
judicial appointment did metropolitan officials uniformly resist the assemblies' influence, and even
here their success was only partial. See GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 125, 342-43.
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well beyond that of the British House of Commons ... and in many cases
obtained a significant share of the traditional powers of the executive."' '
Indeed, the colonial assemblies had thoroughly internalized the lesson of
the Glorious and Financial Revolutions: that a legislature's power to thwart
an overbearing executive derived from its control over raising revenue and
appropriating money."0 They understood as well that a legislature must
never surrender the "'Keys to unlock People[']s Purses.' ,3. In language that
would have been at home during the Convention Parliament,312 one New
Jersey legislator summed up his assembly's political strategy: "'Let us keep
the dogs poore, and we'll make them do what we please.' ,,"
For this reason, when Parliament sought to tax the colonies for the first
time in the 1765 Stamp Act,3 4 colonial assemblies reacted with alarm.31
Concern increased when Parliament followed the Stamp Act's repeal with
the Declaratory Act of 1766, which asserted Parliament's right "to make
laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies and
people of America" (i.e., "tax"), 316 and the Townshend Acts of 1767, which
imposed taxes on imports such as glass, paper, and tea.3 ' The Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Charles Townshend, "intended and the Americans immedi-
ately recognized" that the revenue raised from the Act's duties would be
used "to free royal governors and other royal officials from the control of
the local assemblies. 3 8 Faced with a loss of power on two fronts-the
power to control taxation and the concomitant power to control royal gover-
309. GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 221-22; see also KELLY ET AL., supra note 253, at
27. On the limits of Parliament's ambition in the eighteenth century, see BURNS, supra note 263, at
14-15; and supra note 168.
310. See CASPER, supra note 300, at 73.
311. GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES, supra note 264, at 197 (alteration in original)
(quoting HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES 122 (4th ed., London 1719)).
312. See supra notes 161, 166 and accompanying text.
313. MARCUS W. JERNEGAN, THE AMERICAN COLONIES 1492-1750, at 285 (1929).
314. 5 Geo. 3, c. 12 (1765), repealed by 6 Geo. 3, c. 11 (1765). The Stamp Act was ostensibly
levied to lift from a severely taxed English populace some portion of the burden of a national debt
that the Seven Years' War had swollen to £130,000,000, serviced by annual interest payments of
£4,000,000. See KEIR, supra note 62, at 358. But the Act was also designed to test the constitutional
proposition that Parliament could tax the colonists. See H.W. BRANDS, THE FIRST AMERICAN: THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 360--61 (2000); GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 259, at
79-82.
315. See GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 364-72.
316. 6 Geo. 3, c. 12, § 1 (1766).
317. The Acts consisted of several pieces of legislation. In addition to establishing certain
rates and duties, 7 Geo. 3, c. 46, § 1 (1767), the Acts permitted customs agents to use unpopular
"writs of assistance" (in essence, blank warrants) to search, see id. § 10, and suspended the New
York assembly until it complied with the Quartering Act of 1765, which required colonies to provide
support to British troops, 7 Geo. 3, c. 59 (1767). The duties were repealed, except for the symbolic
tax on tea, in 1770. 10 Geo. 3, c. 17 (1770).
318. BRANDS, supra note 314, at 389; see GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 373. The first
of the Townshend Acts said as much, providing that the revenue raised could be used by the Crown
"for defraying the charges of the administration of justice, and the support of the civil government,
within all or any of the said colonies or plantations." 7 Geo. 3, c. 46, § 5 (1767).
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nors-colonial assemblies took the position that citizens could be taxed only
by a representative body that had elected them."9 The rest is history.
B. Post-Revolutionary Legislative Supremacy over Appropriations
Less needs to be said of the Revolutionary period. On the national level,
the Second Continental Congress did not have the power to tax and did not
serve as a lawmaking body.20 It was an organizing, advisory body that coor-
dinated the efforts of the states to enact legislation, collect taxes, and hold
sovereignty."' The Articles of Confederation, ratified in 1781, authorized
"the United States in Congress" to appropriate money when nine states
32 323
voted to do so, ' but gave no power to tax. Although it performed useful
coordinating work, the Confederation government was not a true legislature
and had no executive branch.32 4
Rather, the prevailing view during the Revolutionary era was that ulti-
mate power resided in the states, which alone had legislatures that
represented the will of the sovereign people.32 3 Once the Revolution com
326
menced, each state established its own government. New constitutions
were adopted in all the colonies except Connecticut and Rhode Island,
which continued with their existing charters after deleting references to roy-
al authority.
32 7
These state constitutions responded to the prevailing fear of executive
authority by increasing the power of the legislatures."" Governors were sub-
ject to frequent elections, limited in the number of terms they might serve,
and given reduced power over appointments. 9 On fiscal matters the state
constitutions adopted the mechanisms that had proven successful during the
colonial period.3 Many contained an origination clause providing that
319. See GREENE, QUEST, supra note 257, at 373-75.
320. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 317,
356 (1969). Because the congresses were not constituted as legislative bodies, they voted on re-
solves or recommendations rather than coercive legislation. Id. at 317.
321. See id. Despite its many limitations, the advice of the Congress was heeded and exer-
cised tremendous influence. See id. at 355 (noting Congress's success in "adopting commercial
codes, establishing and maintaining an army, issuing a continental currency, erecting a military code
of law, defining crimes against the Union, and negotiating abroad").
322. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX, § 6 (U.S. 1781) ("The United States, in Congress
assembled, shall never... appropriate money.., unless nine States assent to the same ... .
323. KELLY ET AL., supra note 253, at 79.
324. See id. at 79-80.
325. Id.
326. See WOOD, supra note 320, at 129-30.
327. GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 65-66 (2002). See generally KELLY ET
AL., supra note 253, at 65-76 (discussing the development of the state constitutions).
328. See KELLY ET AL., supra note 253, at 72-73; WOOD, supra note 327, at 67-68.
329. WOOD, supra note 327, at 67. In Pennsylvania, the office of governor was eliminated
altogether. Id.
330. See CASPER, supra note 300, at 74-75.
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money bills must originate in the lower house.33' Many also provided that
the lower house would appoint treasurers."' The Maryland, Pennsylvania,
and South Carolina constitutions gave their lower houses explicit authority
over appropriations; others subjected the governor's expenditures to a war-
rant requirement or were silent on the matter.3 According to Professor
Casper:
On the whole, the fiscal provisions of the state constitutions confirm...
that during the founding period money matters were thought of primarily
as a legislative prerogative. The reason for this was not simply the insight
that appropriations were appropriations of power. It was also the-for us
perhaps counterintuitive-hope that assuring legislative supremacy in fis-
cal matters would bring about the moderation, temperance, and frugality
without which free government would be endangered.
33 4
C. The Appropriations Clause
1. The Constitutional Convention
No appropriations clause appeared in the Convention's competing origi-
nal plans: the Randolph (or Virginia) Plan, the Patterson (or New Jersey)
Plan, the Pinckney Plan, and the Hamilton Plan.335 The "proto-clause" out of
331. See id. at 76; WOOD, supra note 320, at 242-43. The lower houses were the successors to
the colonial assemblies.
332. See, e.g., CASPER, supra note 300, at 76; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XI[, reprinted in 3
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1693 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS]; PA. CONST. of 1776, sec. 9, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at
3085-86; and VA. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at
3818.
333. See CASPER, supra note 300, at 76. The last clause of the first sentence of Article XVI of
the 1778 South Carolina Constitution, for example, used a negative-language formulation that is
remarkably similar to that now found in the Appropriations Clause. The sentence provides in full:
That all money bills for the support of government shall originate in the house of representa-
tives, and shall not be altered or amended by the senate, but may be rejected by them, and that
no money be drawn out of the public treasury but by the legislative authority of the State.
S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XVI, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1623-24 (photo. reprint 2001)
(Ben Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878).
334. CASPER, supra note 300, at 77.
335. For Madison's notes on these plans, see I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 20-22 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND] (May 29, 1787)
(Randolph Plan); id. at 242-45 (June 15, 1787) (Patterson Plan); id. at 291-93 (June 18, 1787)
(Hamilton Plan). Unless otherwise noted, all references to Farrand in this Article are to the notes of
James Madison.
The exact content of the Pinckney Plan, which Charles Pinckney IfI presented on the same day
as Edmund Randolph presented his, see id. at 23 (May 29, 1787), is debated; no record of his pro-
posal has survived. See The Pinckney Plan, in 3 FARRAND, supra, app. D, at 595. In any event,
Pinckney's plan contained no appropriations clause. Compare id. at 595-601 (containing text that
Pinckney subsequently claimed was his original proposal), with id. at 604-09 (containing recon-
structed text akin to Pinckney's likely submission).
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which the Appropriations Clause developed is found in Randolph's sixth
resolution, which, inter alia, gave both legislative branches "the right of ori-
ginating Acts. 336 After the Constitutional Convention unanimously approved
this dual-origination clause as a separate resolution,337 the clause then
crossed paths with the Patterson Plan-which explicitly gave the national
legislature the power "to pass acts for raising a revenue" 33 -and became a
critical component of the ensuing Great Compromise. Although the wisdom
of an appropriations clause was never doubted, the fate of the Constitutional
Convention, and of the Constitution itself, ultimately turned on its exact
form.
The reason was the nature of the Patterson Plan, which (in contrast to
Randolph's proposal for proportional representation in both houses of the
legislature) gave an equal vote to every state. Randolph and other delegates
from populous states vehemently objected to the Patterson Plan.339 One of
their principal arguments was that, once the national legislature received the
power to tax, disproportionate representation would allow a minority of citi-
zens to tax the majority. 34° Trying to find a middle ground, Benjamin
Franklin offered a proposal whose language foreshadowed that of the
Appropriations Clause: he recommended that equal representation should
exist in the second branch of the legislature, but that proportionate voting
should be used "in all appropriations & dispositions of money to be drawn
out of the General Treasury; and in all laws for supplying that Treasury."4'
Franklin's proposal went nowhere, but a committee charged with devel-
oping a compromise recommended a plan that likewise gave states an equal
vote in the second branch. The committee's compromise provided that "'all
bills for raising or appropriating money"' would originate in the first
336. 1 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 21 (May 29, 1787).
337. See id. at 236 (June 13, 1787). When brought to the Convention floor, this resolution
generated no significant debate and passed unanimously. Id. at 429 (June 26, 1787).
338. Id. at 243 (June 15, 1787).
339. Id. at 255-56 (June 16, 1787) (statement of Edmund Randolph); id. at 253-54 (statement
of James Wilson). The fullest criticism of the plan was Madison's own. Id. at 314-22 (June 19,
1787) (statement of James Madison). According to Yates's (but not Madison's) notes, one of
Randolph's objections to equal representation focused on the need to provide a national legislature
to pay the national government's creditors. Id. at 262 (Robert Yates, June 16, 1787) (statement of
Edmund Randolph). On the national debt, see infra notes 373-385 and accompanying text.
340. See I FARRAND, supra note 335, at 338-39 (June 20, 1787) (statement of George Ma-
son); id. at 446-47 (June 28, 1787) (statement of James Madison); id. at 464 (June 29, 1787)
(statement of James Madison) (arguing that taxation based on unequal representation "would subject
the system to the reproaches & evils which have resulted from the vicious representation of G.B.
[Great Britain]").
341. Id. at 489 (June 30, 1787). Franklin prefaced his proposal with a homey parable that did
Poor Richard proud. After noting that the small states feared "their liberties will be in danger" with
proportionate representation and that the large states feared "their money will be in danger" without
it, he said, "When a broad table is to be made, and the edges (of planks do not fit) the artist takes a
little from both, and makes a good joint." hl at 488. Some have credited Franklin's intervention with
putting the Great Compromise on course, see BRANDS, supra note 314, at 682, but the motion to
provide equal representation in the second branch was already on the floor when Franklin spoke, see
1 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 468 (June 29, 1787).
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branch; that such bills "'shall not be altered or amended by the 2d branch:
and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury, but in pursuance
of appropriations to be originated by the 1st branch.' ,342 On July 16, the
Convention voted (five states to four, with Massachusetts divided) to adopt
the framework of the Great Compromise, including the committee's lan-
guage on the origination of revenue and appropriations bills.3
At that point, the fireworks that nearly derailed the Convention began.
On August 6, the Committee of Detail reported a draft constitution that in-
corporated the prior debates and decisions. Two clauses were critical. First,
Section 5 of Article IV reflected the earlier agreement: "All bills for raising
or appropriating money ... shall originate in the House of Representatives,
and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate. No money shall be drawn
from the public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations that shall origi-
nate in the House of Representatives."3" Second, Section 12 of Article VI
stated: "Each House shall possess the right of originating bills, except in the
cases beforementioned." '
The first clause came up for discussion and vote on August 8, and it
sparked vigorous debate. Charles Pinckney III moved to strike Section 5 in
its entirety, arguing that "[i]f the Senate can be trusted with the many great
powers proposed, it surely may be trusted with that of originating money
bills."'3' George Mason argued that "[t]o strike out the section, was to un-
hinge the compromise of which it made a part," and that, because the Senate
would be an aristocratic body, "[t]he purse strings should never be put into
its hands. 34' James Madison thought that Section 5 was "of no advantage to
the large States" and would be "a source of injurious altercations between
the two Houses. 34 s Pinckney's motion carried, seven states to four.3 9
With that vote, the delicate prior compromise blew open. The following
morning, Edmund Randolph "expressed his dissatisfaction" about the vote,
arguing that it "endanger[ed] the success of the plan, and [was] extremely
objectionable in itself."35 On August 13, Randolph proposed amendments to
the first sentence of Section 5. Arguing for these amendments, George
Mason appealed to the English practice that permitted only the House of
Commons to originate tax bills because the House of Lords, like the pro-
posed Senate, was "not elected by the people., 31 After extensive discussion,
342. 1 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 526 (July 5, 1787).
343. 2 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 14 (Journal, July 16, 1787). Madison's notes of this lan-
guage vary slightly from the official journal's text. See id. at 16.
344. Id. at 178 (Aug. 6, 1787).
345. Id. at 181.
346. Id. at 224 (Aug. 8, 1787).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 214, 215 fig. (Journal, Aug. 8, 1787).
350. Id. at 230 (Aug. 9, 1787).
351. Id. at 274 (Aug. 13, 1787). On the Commons's power of origination, see supra note 147.
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the Convention voted down Randolph's amendments, again by a vote of
seven states to four.352 Turning to the second sentence of Section 5-which
is the direct precursor to the Appropriations Clause-the Convention voted
it down by ten states to one."'
This defeat put the fate of the Great Compromise into doubt-not be-
cause anyone questioned the wisdom of legislative control over
appropriations, but because the sides could not agree whether the right of
originating taxation and appropriations bills should rest in a body with pro-
portionate representation. For some, representative control over taxation and
appropriations was so vital that, without it, they were willing to overthrow
the Compromise and revisit the decision to provide equal representation in
the Senate. They had a clear opportunity to do so when Section 12 of Article
6, which needed amendment in light of the votes on August 13, came up for
discussion.
The morning of August 15 opened with a discussion of Section 12.
Caleb Strong proposed an amendment that substituted language akin to the
first sentence of the defeated Section 5 of Article IV for the language of Sec-
tion 12 of Article VI.354 It was evident by now that the issues of origination
and equal state representation were inextricably entwined-indeed, while the
Convention had approved the equal-representation provision on August 9,
Mason and Randolph had made plain their intention to seek reconsideration if
the decision on origination were not reversed."' Thus, when the issue arose on
August 15, Hugh Williamson moved to postpone consideration of Section 12
"till the powers of the Senate should be gone over."356 The motion carried,
six states to five.357 And when Mason moved to recall Section 12 for discus-
sion on August 21, the Convention voted him down.'
The issue arose again on September 5, however, when a committee
suggested that Section 12 sever the right of origination from that of
appropriation. The compromise provided that "all Bills for raising revenue
shall originate in the House of representatives and shall be subject to
352. 2 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 280 (Aug. 13, 1787). The principal objections to
Randolph's amendments concerned their ambiguities and the legislative gamesmanship that a
sole-origination clause would allow. Id. at 276-77 (statement of James Madison); id. at 279-80
(statement of John Rutledge). Rutledge pointed out that his state, South Carolina, had a comparable
clause, see supra note 333, which had led to considerable mischief by "continually dividing &
heating the two houses." 2 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 280 (Aug. 13, 1787).
353. 2 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 280 (Aug. 13, 1787). Only Massachusetts voted in the
affirmative. Id.
354. Id. at 297 (Aug. 15, 1787).
355. Id. at 234 (Aug. 9, 1787) (statements of George Mason and Edmund Randolph).
356. Id. at 297 (Aug. 15, 1787).
357. Id. at 296 & fig. (Journal, Aug. 15, 1787). Curiously, John Rutledge, who had opposed
the single-origination idea, see supra note 352, seconded Williamson's motion. 2 FARRAND, supra
note 335, at 297 (Aug. 15, 1787).
358. 2 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 353, 355 (Journal, Aug. 21, 1787); id. at 357 (Aug. 21,
1787). The vote was again six states to five. Mason had asked for the recall because he "wished to
know how the proposed amendment as to money bills would be decided, before he agreed to any
further points." Id.
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alterations and amendments by the Senate: No money shall be drawn from
the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.
' 359
The Convention initially postponed consideration of the proposal, °
but returned to it on September 8, when it unanimously agreed to amend
the first clause slightly and then voted, nine states to two, to adopt it.36,
The second clause, which is essentially the text of the present Appropria-
tions Clause, was not put to a vote.
362
The Committee of Style thereafter split the two clauses, putting the sole-
origination power over revenue bills into Section 7 of Article 1363 and the
dual-origination power over appropriations into Section 9 of Article l. 4 On
September 14, the Convention adopted a motion by Mason to add what is
now the Statements and Accounts Clause 36 to the end of what is now the
Appropriations Clause. 366 After some polishing, the Appropriations Clause
became part of the Constitution.
This history reveals two matters of importance. First, the Convention
never had in mind that the right of appropriation could be exercised by any
branch other than the legislature. The only debate, which occurred only after
it became apparent that the Senate would not have proportionate representa-
tion, was whether the House would have the sole right to originate revenue
and appropriation bills. There is no warrant to believe that judges had any
authority to appropriate money from the treasury. On the contrary, the his-
tory is clear that the relief obtained in the Bankers' Case-a judicial writ to
obtain money from the Exchequer-cannot be regarded as an appropriation
"made by Law" under the Appropriations Clause.
Second, a reading of the debates of the Convention reveals many issues
that divided the delegates-slavery, whether sovereignty resided in the peo-
ple or in the states, whether representative democracy would work, how
much Congress should be permitted to regulate commerce, the strength of
the Presidency, and many others. But there was widespread agreement that,
in the words of Roger Sherman, "money matters" were for the government
"the most important of all";367 or, as Madison put it, the "compleat power of
359. Id. at 505 (Journal, Sept. 5, 1787).
360. Id. The vote was nine states to two. Id. at 510 (Sept. 5, 1787). Roger Sherman opposed
postponement because he wanted to give "immediate ease to those who looked on this clause as of
great moment." Id.
361. Id. at 545 (Journal, Sept. 8, 1787); id. at 552 (Sept. 8, 1787).
362. See id. at 552.
363. Report of Committee of Style (Sept. 12, 1787), in 2 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 590,
593; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. I ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House
of Representatives .... ").
364. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 363, at 596.
365. For the text of the Statements and Accounts Clause, see supra note 11.
366. 2 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 618-19 (Sept. 14, 1787).
367. 1 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 342 (June 20, 1787).
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taxation [was] the highest prerogative of supremacy ... proposed to be
vested in the National Govt."36
Throughout the debates, delegates expressed concern for the "purse
strings"' 69 or the "purse" 37-always regarding the protection of the people's
money as a legislative function.371 No delegate voiced the opinion that the
judicial branch would have any say in the government's finances. Nor would
such a power have made sense at the time. With more than two hundred
years' distance, it is easy to forget that the idea of a judiciary as a distinct
branch of government was new. In the English system, courts were part of
the Crown's administration of government; they were in the process of tran-
372
sition to an independent branch during the eighteenth century. To have
entrusted fiscal matters to such a group of officials would have been incon-
sistent with the principle of legislative supremacy over finance.
Indeed, the Convention's discussions about the national debt are particu-
larly telling. The Confederation government owed approximately $52
million to its creditors-principally from obligations it had incurred from
foreign governments, suppliers, and soldiers during the Revolutionary
War.3 73 Its inability to repay this debt-in fact, it had suspended interest
payments on most of the debt374-was one of the principal embarrassments
that had led to calls for a stronger national government.3 75 But the issue of
the national debt was freighted with regional, class, and economic over-
tones.376 The delegates agreed that the new government must honor the
368. Id. at 447 (June 28, 1787).
369. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 274 (Aug. 13, 1787) (statement of George
Mason).
370. See, e.g., id at 275 (statement of Elbridge Gerry).
371. Delegates occasionally expressed concern that too much power was being vested in the
legislative branch, especially because it controlled both the sword and the purse. See I FARRAND,
supra note 335, at 346 (June 20, 1787) (statement of George Mason); 2 FARRAND, supra note 335, at
76 (July 21, 1787) (statement of Gouvemeur Morris); id. at 329 (Aug. 18, 1787) (statement of El-
bridge Gerry). Out of this concern eventually developed the one limitation on Congress's
appropriations power: its inability to appropriate funds to "raise and support Armies .. . for a longer
Term than two Years" (a period chosen because it corresponded with the cycle of elections for the
House). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
372. See 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 249, at 346, 414-16, 720; KEIR, supra note 62, at 263,
293-97,312-14.
373. This amount was Hamilton's estimate of the debt in 1790. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUND-
ING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 55 (2000). States owed another $25 million. Id.
374. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 280 (2004).
375. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 347 (June 20, 1787) (statement of Roger Sherman);
JAMES MADISON, Preface to Debates in the Convention (n.d.), in NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 1, 7-9 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1966).
376. Because some states (especially in the North) had borne the brunt of the fighting, they
tended to have greater debt. In addition, some states had been more vigilant in retiring their debt
than others. Therefore, if the federal government assumed state debts, the citizens of those states
that had paid their debts were going to be taxed to meet other states' debts. In addition, there was a
general impression that speculators--especially Northern financiers--had taken advantage of desti-
tute soldiers and bought up their securities for pennies on the dollar. See CHERNOW, supra note 374,
at 297-99, 303-04, 322; 2 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 356 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of Elbridge
Gerry); infra note 378 and accompanying text.
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obligations of the old.37  But the extent of responsibility and the form that
this payment should take depended on an individual delegate's degree of
contempt for financiers and speculators.37 The Convention entertained mul-
tiple drafts, trying to find the right words to express the new government's
responsibility for the national debt.3 79 Delegates argued about whether the
Constitution should guarantee payment of the Confederation's debts or
Congress should have the power to pay them as it saw fit.3"' They also dis-
cussed how payments might be funded, with one draft providing (in
language that never made its way into the final document) that Congress
could appropriate a "perpetual revenue" to service the interest on the debt.38" '
In the end, the delegates compromised on language declaring, "Debts ...
shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under
the Confederation," '382 and granting power to Congress to levy taxes in order
to "pay the Debts."3 3 These decisions show that the delegates to the Conven-
tion were well aware of the history of the struggle between the Crown and
Parliament over appropriations and of its outcome.
The holders of these debts were in exactly the same position toward the
United States as the bankers, goldsmiths, depositors, and investors in the
Bankers' Case had been toward Charles II-right down to the suspension of
interest payments and the purchase of the debts by speculators.3 4 Never
once in the debates was it suggested that these "public Creditors""3  were
within their rights to file a claim in court or that they might be able to do so
in the courts of the new government. Handling the claims of creditors was
understood to be an appropriations matter-in other words, a legislative
377. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 327-28 (Aug. 18, 1787) (statements of John
Rutledge, George Mason, Roger Sherman, Oliver Ellsworth, Charles Pinckney III, and Rufus
King).
378. Pierce Butler called the speculators "Blood-suckers," id. at 392 (Aug. 23, 1787), and
George Mason derided "stock-jobbing," id. at 413 (Aug. 25, 1787). See also CHERNOW, supra note
374, at 303 (describing vitriol expressed toward such speculators in 1790).
379. For the principal drafts and discussions regarding those drafts, see 2 FARRAND, supra
note 335, at 325-26 (Aug. 18, 1787); id. at 355-56 (Aug. 21, 1787); id. at 366-67, 376-77 (Aug.
22, 1787); id. at 392 (Aug. 23, 1787); id. at 412-14 (Aug. 25, 1787); and id. at 497, 499 (Sept. 4,
1787).
380. See id. at 356 (Aug. 21, 1787); id. at 412-14 (Aug. 25, 1787).
381. See id. at 325-26 (Aug. 18, 1787) (motion of Charles Pinckney III). In the ensuing dis-
cussions, the Convention unanimously agreed with a motion of George Mason that the drafting
committee should "prepare a clause for restraining perpetual revenue." Id. at 327. A later draft in-
corporated this idea, Id. at 366-67 (Aug. 22, 1787). The notes of the debates do not explain why this
language never made its way into the Constitution.
382. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 1.
383. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare
. ...."). The restriction of army appropriations to two years, see supra note 371, made further action
on a "perpetual revenue" limitation unnecessary.
384. See supra notes 150, 153, 236 and accompanying text.
385. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 325 (Aug. 18, 1787) (motion of Charles Pinckney
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function. And the delegates reflected this understanding by giving Congress
the exclusive power to decide whether to repay them.
2. Ratification Debates
The Appropriations Clause was far from the front lines of the ratification
386debates. Those who have tried to glean from the debates some inkling of
the constitutional fate of sovereign immunity have typically focused on a
couple of paragraphs in Hamilton's Federalist No. 81, certain anti-Federalist
writings, and the comments of Henry, Madison, Marshall, and Randolph
during the Virginia debates.387 Those texts, however, deal with the states'
amenability to suit, and none address the immunity of the national govern-
ment. 8 A virtual silence on such a matter might seem curious-until
considered in light of the widely shared view about legislative supremacy
over appropriations. Viewed through this lens, the standard texts take on
new meaning, and some usually neglected texts become significant.
First, in Federalist No. 48, Madison addressed the need for tension
among the different branches of government. He argued that the legislative
power was by far the most extensive, in part because-unlike the executive
or the judiciary-"the legislative department alone has access to the pock-
ets of the people." '389 In Federalist No. 58, Madison returned to the point.
In responding to the concern that the equality of representation in the Senate
might allow a minority to frustrate the will of a majority, he famously ar-
gued:
The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can pro-
pose the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word,
hold the purse-that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the his-
tory of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the
people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and
finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown pre-
rogatives of the other branches of the government. This power over the
purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon
with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the
386. For instance, in the Virginia debates over Section 9 of Article 1, the Appropriations Clause
received only a glancing, matter-of-fact mention by Edmund Randolph. See 3 DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 465 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (remarks of
Edmund Randolph on June 15, 1788).
387. For a review of this history, see Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of
History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1, 30-85 (2002). For recent examples of the Supreme Court's selective use
of this history, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716-18 (1999); id. at 773-76 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 70 & nn.12-13 (1996); and id. at 104-06, 142-
50 (Souter, J., dissenting).
388. For statements of George Nicholas and George Mason containing brief references to the
fate of federal sovereign immunity under the Constitution, see infra note 397 and accompanying
text.
389. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 278 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into ef-
fect every just and salutary measure.
... To those causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the British
House of Commons over the other branches of the government, whenever
the engine of a money bill has been employed.3'9
Second, in Federalist No. 78, Hamilton argued for an independent judi-
ciary. In explaining the conclusion reached in the oft-quoted first sentence of
this excerpt, he referred to the appropriations power of Congress:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must
perceive that, in a government in which they are separated from each other,
the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dan-
gerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in
a capacity to annoy or injure them. The executive not only dispenses the
honors but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only
commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights
of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no
influence over either the sword or the purse....
Indeed, even in the sovereign-immunity passage in Federalist No. 81
that has so provoked debate, Hamilton denied the power of federal courts to
entertain suits against the states by means of an example particularly salient
to anyone who understood the aftermath of the Bankers' Case and the debts
of the state and federal governments:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent .... [T]here is no color to pretend that the
State governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the
privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every con-
straint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith.' 9'
Hamilton's phrase, "the obligations of good faith," echoes Mansfield's con-
temporary observation in Macbeath that "whoever advances money for the
390. Id. No. 58, at 327 (James Madison).
391. Id. No. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id. No. 72, at 403-04 (Alexander
Hamilton) (noting that the executive's functions included "the application and disbursement of the
public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature").
392. Id. No. 81, at 455-56 (Alexander Hamilton). Some have doubted the sincerity of
Hamilton's argument. See Randall, supra note 387, at 71-79. We have no intent to enter that
debate insofar as it relates to whether the states ceded their immunity in the Constitution. Our
point here is that, due to legislative control over fiscal matters, the idea of a judicial remedy for a
breach of a sovereign's obligation had undergone a transformation from the time of the Bankers'
Case. Whether or not he believed his argument, Hamilton was invoking the common understanding
of the day to persuade his audience.
Hamilton certainly believed that handling the national debt was a legislative-not a judicial-
matter once he became Secretary of the Treasury. Convinced the debt should be paid in full to pre-
sent holders, and further convinced that state debts should be assumed, Hamilton ramrodded the
necessary legislation through Congress-outmaneuvering his former ally, James Madison, and
earning Madison's undying enmity. Hamilton's plan to repay the debt was in some regards not un-
like the plan Parliament implemented in the wake of the Bankers' Case: it partially repudiated the
interest on the debt through various devices, and it created a sinking fund to deal with the remainder.
See CHERNOW, supra note 374, at 295-306, 320-31.
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public service trusts to the faith of Parliament."'3 93 Determining the circum-
stances under which the government was liable for monetary relief was a
legislative, not a judicial, function.
The same echo can be heard in Virginia's ratification debates. In
discussing Article VI's controversial assumption of the Confederation's
debts, 94 Madison observed that the provision created no new obligations
toward creditors but merely maintained the old. He then added that payment
of this debt "rests on the obligation of public faith only, in the Articles of
Confederation. It will be so in this Constitution, should it be adopted."'3 95 In
response, Patrick Henry referred to recent legislation in Virginia, which had
effectively reduced Virginia's liability to British creditors, and wondered
whether similar relief would remain open under Article VI.396 George
Nicholas replied:
There is no law under the existing system which gives power to any tribu-
nal to enforce the payment of such claims. On the will of Congress alone
the payment depends.... Those who have this money must make applica-
tion to Congress for payment....
... [Henry] supposes that Congress may be sued by those speculators.
Where is the clause that gives that power? It gives no such power. This, ac-
cording to my idea, is inconsistent. Can the supreme legislature be sued in
their own subordinate courts, by their own citizens, in cases where they are
not a party? They may be plaintiffs, but not defendants.397
Edmund Randolph continued Nicholas's theme, noting that creditors would
be in the same position as they had been before Article VI:
There is no tribunal to recur to by the old government. There is none in the
new for that purpose....
I come now to what will be agitated by the judiciary. They are to enforce
the performance of private contracts.... The federal judiciary cannot in-
termeddle with those public claims without violating the letter of the
Constitution.'3"
393. Macbeath v. Haldimand, 1 T.R. 172, 99 Eng. Rep. 1036, 1038 (K.B. 1786); see supra
note 247 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 373-383 and accompanying text.
395. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 386, at 473 (remarks of James Madison on June 15,
1788).
396. Id. (remarks of Patrick Henry on June 15, 1788); see 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1370 n. 14 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993).
397. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 386, at 476-77 (remarks of George Nicholas on June
15, 1788). George Mason questioned Nicholas's reasoning that the United States could not be made
a defendant, calling it "incomprehensible." Id. at 480 (remarks of George Mason on June 15, 1788).
Mason would subsequently point to language in Article L giving federal courts jurisdiction over
"Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party," see U.S. CONST. art. IMI, § 2, cl. 4, as the
basis for suits against the United States. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 386, at 525-26 (remarks
of George Mason on June 18, 1788).
398. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 386, at 478 (emphasis added) (remarks of Edmund
Randolph on June 15, 1788).
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Three days later, in discussing whether Article III permitted private citizens
to sue states, John Marshall, in oft-quoted language,3 rejected the notion.
He closed his argument with a rhetorical question intended to express the
nature of the remedy that private persons enjoyed in the absence of a law-
suit: "If an individual has a just claim against any particular state, is it to be
presumed that, on application to its legislature, he will not obtain satisfac-
tion?"4m
In short, the shared understanding of both those favoring and those op-
posed to the Constitution was that legislatures, which controlled
appropriations from the public treasury, controlled the award of claims
against the sovereign) 0'
D. Closing the Loop: The Appropriations Power
and Sovereign Immunity
At this point, we can assemble the evidence linking the appropriations
power and the federal government's sovereign immunity in damages ac-
tions.
In eighteenth-century England, the notion that the Crown could be
sued had given way to the new reality that Parliament controlled the dis-
bursement of government funds. 4°' At the time of the Bankers' Case,
courts were not viewed as a separate branch of government but as a part
of the Crown's machinery for administering the state.03 That case, in
combination with the broader Financial Revolution, ushered a shift from
writs in the Exchequer to appropriations in Parliament: a shift, at base,
from executive to legislative control over the appropriation of money.404
As Mansfield perceptively recognized in Macbeath, this reallocation of
political and fiscal power forced a reconceptualization of the idea of sov-
ereign immunity. As a theoretical matter, it seemed unlikely to Mansfield
that the courts, which were still emerging from the shadow of the Crown
into an independent branch, had retained the political authority to grant
399. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 718 (1999); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 267-68 (1985).
400. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 386, at 556 (remarks of John Marshall on June 20,
1788).
401. The arguments of other anti-Federalists that Article 1I contained a waiver of sovereign
immunity against the states assumed that the states were at the time immune from suit except to the
extent that they chose to waive immunity. See generally Randall, supra note 387, at 47-54 (describ-
ing the range of anti-Federalist opinions). These anti-Federalists did not explain their assumption-
an interesting omission in light of the English tradition leading up to, as well as the result in, the
Bankers' Case. On our reading, the anti-Federalist assumption only makes sense when viewed in the
light of a shared understanding that Parliament and the colonial assemblies had both won legislative
supremacy over fiscal matters.
402. See supra notes 167-180, 233-248 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 59, 372 and accompanying text.
404. It is helpful to recall Professor Desan's observation that what Lord Somers tried (and
ultimately failed) to preserve in the Bankers' Case was executive discretion in the appropriation of
funds. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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monetary relief against the Crown; as a practical matter, claimants' need
to obtain parliamentary appropriations rendered inconsequential any ar-
guable residual power that the courts retained.405
Nothing in the American experience points to a different conclusion.
In the eighteenth century, colonial legislatures fought for-and secured-
the same control over appropriations that Parliament had won only a few
decades earlier. Indeed, the colonial assemblies in many ways pushed the
appropriations envelope farther than Parliament had been willing to do,
launching a deeper invasion into traditional executive prerogatives. 406 In
the Appropriations Clause, the Constitutional Convention summed up the
lesson of 175 years of English and colonial political history: if it was to
maintain its power, the legislature-not the executive, nor the nascent
judiciary-must control the public purse.
It is only a small, and logical, step from constitutionally commanded
legislative control over disbursements from the purse to constitutionally
commanded legislative control over private claims against the purse. The
colonial assemblies had adjudicated monetary claims asserted against the
colonial governments; 407 the assumption in the ratification debates was
that state legislatures would retain that power after independence and that
Congress would enjoy the same power after ratification. 4°' Colonial
assemblies had worked too hard to obtain dominion over the fisc for it to
be credible that the framers intended to cede judges a portion of that
power sub silentio. The Framers' initial failure to place the functions of
originating both tax bills and appropriations bills in the House of
Representatives had nearly ruined the Great Compromise. The
Constitution had been ultimately rescued by the controversial expedient
of splitting the tax and appropriations functions and giving the Senate an
equal opportunity to originate appropriations bills0 9 Thus, the idea that
the Constitution also handed a chunk of the appropriations power to
unelected Article III judges is fanciful at best.
The Appropriations Clause was a statement of raw political power-
the second of the two great powers (taxation was the other) from which
Parliament and colonial assemblies derived all others. As a practical mat-
ter, it rendered lawsuits against the government irrelevant and
unnecessary. Indeed, as we look to events after the ratification of the Ap-
propriations Clause, we see precisely this understanding.
In Chisholm v. Georgia,4 0 the Supreme Court held that Article III
gave federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over actions against a state
405. See supra notes 247-248 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 307-309 and accompanying text.
407. See supra note 257 and accompanying text; see also Desan, The Constitutional Commit-
ment, supra note 243, at 1443 & n.285 (noting that there is no evidence of the petition of right or other
judicial mechanisms being used to adjudicate claims against New York's colonial government).
408. See supra Section ll.C.2.
409. See supra notes 348-366 and accompanying text.
410. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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by a citizen of another state seeking to recover money. This 4-1 decision
resulted in the rapid passage of the Eleventh Amendment-and the even-
tual recognition that Justice Iredell's dissenting opinion was "the better
authority."'41' But before coming to that dissent, it is worth noting two as-
pects of the arguments made against state immunity. First, Edmund
Randolph believed that a judgment ordering Georgia to pay was enforce-
able by execution, and that any state found liable would comply with
such a judgment.4 2 Likewise, Chief Justice John Jay distinguished the
case of a state (which he believed was not immune) from the case of the
United States (which he believed remained immune) on the principle that
federal courts could not require the other branches of the federal govern-
ment to enforce judgments against the United States.413 Thus, both
Randolph and Jay linked judgment with enforcement; the incapacity of
courts to provide a remedy also rendered them incapable of entering
judgment against the United States. On this view, if the Appropriations
Clause blocks the enforcement of a monetary remedy against the United
States, it also blocks the lawsuit.
Second, in arguing for Georgia's liability, Randolph pointed to the an-
cient petition of right, the monstrans de droit, and the "process in the
Exchequer" that was used in the Bankers' Case 4 Like Jay, he believed
that the federal government remained immune from suit. He therefore
contended that these common-law remedies had no general applicability
to the United States, and that they were "widely remote" from a general
principle of "involuntary subjection[] of the sovereign to the .cognizance
of his own Courts., 415 Randolph distinguished the Bankers' Case by
claiming that it applied only when "the charge is claimed against the
Revenue.416 This seemingly cryptic distinction makes sense in context.
The Bankers' Case had arisen at a time when the Crown had an independ-
ent revenue from which it was expected to govern and pay the
government's debts . 7 If the Crown appropriated (i.e., "charged" or
"aliened ' 411) this revenue, it was liable under the authority of the Bankers'
Case. But that time had long passed. Randolph's distinction thus parroted
Mansfield's conclusion that Parliament's decision to end the appropria-
411. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 676 (1838).
412. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 426-27.
413. Id. at 478 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). Jay included an important qualification that bears di-
rectly on the effect of legislative financial supremacy on the shape of sovereign immunity: he stated
that his reasoning would not extend to suits brought against states by individuals "on bills of credit
issued before the Constitution was established, and which were issued and received on the faith of
the State, and at a time when no ideas or expectations of judicial interposition were entertained or
contemplated." Id. at 479.
414. Id. at 425. On these remedies, see supra notes 21-34, 181-230 and accompanying text.
415. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 425.
416. Id.
417. See supra notes 65, 135, 183-184 and accompanying text.
418. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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tion of an independent revenue eviscerated the precedential value of the
Bankers' Case on the issue of the national sovereign's immunity.
Iredell's dissent expanded on Randolph's point in a way that brought
the Appropriations Clause directly into the equation. After a thorough
examination of the Bankers' Case,4 9 Iredell turned to "a very late case inS 420
England": Macbeath v. Haldimand. Relying upon Mansfield's opinion,
he observed that the King formerly had "fixed and independent revenues,
upon which depended the ordinary support of Government, as well as the
expenditure for his own private occasions. 42' Iredell further stated that:
A very important distinction may however perhaps now subsist between
[the Crown's private debts and those it incurred to run the government],
for the reasons intimated by Lord Mansfield; since the whole support of
Government depends now on Parliamentary provisions, and, except in
the case of the civil list, those for the most part annual.
Thus, it appears, that in England even in case of a private debt con-
tracted by the King, in his own person, there is no remedy but by
petition .... If the debt contracted be avowedly for the public uses of
Government, it is at least doubtful whether that remedy will lie, and if it
will, it remains afterwards in the power of Parliament to provide for it
42or not among the current supplies of the year.
Turning to the case of state governments, Iredell argued that those
who contract with the state "do it at their own peril. 423 In such contracts,
he explained, "public faith alone is the ground of relief, and the Legisla-
tive body the only one that can afford a remedy, which from the very
nature of it must be the effect of its discretion, and not of any compulsory
process.''424 Iredell then assumed arguendo that a petition of right was still
available. This led him to the conclusion that:
The only constituted authority to which such an application could with
any propriety be made, must undoubtedly be the Legislature, whose ex-
press consent, upon the principle of analogy, would be necessary to any
further proceeding. So that this brings us (though by a different route)
to the same goal; The discretion and good faith of the Legislative
body.
425
Early commentaries on the Constitution also drew an explicit connec-
tion between the Appropriations Clause and the sovereign immunity of
the federal government in damage actions. In 1803, St. George Tucker
419. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 437-42 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
420. Id. at 444. For an analysis of Macbeath, see supra notes 245-248 and accompanying text.
421. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 445 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
422. Id.
423. Id. at 446.
424. Id.
425. Id. Of necessity, Iredell's conclusion appears to apply to any relief sought from the federal
government.
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stated that the Clause guarantees "the right of the people . . . to be actu-
ally consulted upon the disposal of the money which they have brought
into the treasury.' 426 But he noted "an inconvenience" in this generally
"salutary check" 427:
According to the theory of the American constitutions, the judiciary
ought to be enabled to afford complete redress in all cases .... But...
no claim against the United States (by whatever authority it may be es-
tablished,) can be paid, but in consequence of a previous appropriation
made by law; unless, perhaps, it might be considered as falling properly
under the head of contingent charges against the government.4
28
Likewise, Joseph Story agreed with Tucker that the Appropriations
Clause barred suits of "creditors of the government, and other persons
having vested claims against it. '42 9 But Story disputed whether their in-
ability "to recover, and to be paid the amount judicially ascertained to be
due to them out of the public treasury, without any appropriation" was a
"defect." 430 Indeed, he described the "evils of an opposite nature" that
might arise "if the debts, judicially ascertained to be due to an individual
by a regular judgment, were to be paid, of course, out of the public treas-
urey. It might give an opportunity for collusion and corruption in the
management of suits. 43'
432Like some modern scholars, both Tucker and Story saw the
Appropriations Clause primarily as a limit on the ability of the
government to pay a judgment, not on the ability of a court to enter a
judgment. This view failed to appreciate that the history of legislative
supremacy over appropriations was not simply a limit on remedy, but also
a limit on the very authority to hear the claim. In later cases, however, the
Supreme Court has never wavered in holding that the Appropriations
Clause bars the judicial branch from entertaining lawsuits seeking relief
426. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS note D, at 362 (photo. reprint 1996) (1803).
427. Id.
428. Id. at 362-63. Tucker's reading of the Clause in the context of sovereign immunity is
open to some criticism. First, he seems to suggest that the Clause bars only the remedy, not the right
to sue-contrary to the views of Randolph and Jay in Chisholm. See supra notes 412-418 and ac-
companying text. Second, contrary to Jay, see supra note 413 and accompanying text, Tucker
thought federal courts could entertain suits against the United States because of the federal question
jurisdiction granted them in Article 111, see TUCKER, supra note 426, at 363 n. Yet, because he be-
lieved that the Appropriations Clause made it impossible for the courts to enforce their judgments,
he proposed an amendment to the Clause: "that no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in
consequence of appropriations made by law; or, of a judicial sentence of a court of [the] United
States." Id. at 364.
429. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1343, at 214 (1833).
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. See Bandes, supra note 16; Jackson, Suing the Federal Government, supra note 16.
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from the federal government.433 In Reeside v. Walker,43 for example, the
Court refused to authorize a writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary of the
Treasury to pay a judgment on a counterclaim against the United States.
The requested writ looked much like the writ sought in the Bankers' Case
against the barons of the Exchequer-and it failed because of the "well-
known constitutional provision, that no money can be taken or drawn from
the Treasury except under an appropriation by Congress.,' 4 " Noting that
"[a]ny other course would give to the fiscal officers a most dangerous
discretion," the Court made clear that "the petitioner should have presented
her claim on the United States to Congress, and prayed for an appropriation
to pay it.
'437
More recently, in Office of Personal Management v. Richmond,438 the
Supreme Court refused to order the payment of disability benefits to which
the plaintiff would have been entitled but for erroneous advice given by a
federal employee. It held that "[flor... a claim for money from the Federal
Treasury, the Clause provides an explicit rule of decision. Money may be
paid out only through an appropriation made by law; in other words, the
payment of money from the Treasury must be authorized by a statute. 439
The Court thus relied explicitly upon the Clause in limiting the judiciary's
ability to enter a judgment against the govemment.4° After noting that strict
adherence to the Clause prevented fraud and corruption, it acknowledged
the Clause's "more fundamental and comprehensive purpose": "to assure
that public funds will be spent according to the letter of the difficult judg-
ments reached by Congress as to the common good and not according to the
individual favor of Government agents or the individual pleas of litigants."'
4
1
433. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210
(1981); United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976); Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States,
301 U.S. 308 (1937); Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62 (1886); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149
(1877); and Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 20 (1846). See also Dep't of the Army v. Blue
Fox Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 264 (1999) ("[S]overeign immunity bars creditors from attaching or garnish-
ing funds in the Treasury... "); cf Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 94
(1992) (holding that, in an in rem forfeiture action, property can be returned to the owner as long as
the proceedings are not "final at the time the appropriations question arose").
434. 52 U.S. (II How.) 272 (1850).
435. The United States sued James Reeside, a contractor, for the return of $32,709.62, which
it had overpaid. Reeside presented evidence that the government owed him money for allowances
which the government had rejected. A jury found for Reeside in the amount of $188,496.06. Id. at
272-74.
436. Id. at291.
437. Id.
438. 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
439. Id. at 424.
440. Id. at 426 ("[Jludicial use of the equitable doctrine of estoppel cannot grant... a money
remedy that Congress has not authorized.").
441. Id. at 427-28; see also id. at 434 ("The rationale of the Appropriations Clause is that if
individual hardships are to be remedied by payment of Government funds, it must be at the instance
of Congress."); United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) ("The established rule is that
the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that public funds
may be expended unless prohibited by Congress.").
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Our point here is simple: the history of the Appropriations Clause re-
flects, from the outset, that its meaning was never disputed as a matter of
principle and its import was clear. Absent Congressional assent, the Clause
precluded suits against the federal government for damages.
CONCLUSION
On both sides, the standard historical arguments over sovereign immu-
nity start from the same point: the pre-Constitutional common law of
sovereign immunity. The sides divide over whether sovereign immunity re-
mained just that-a common-law doctrine amenable to subsequent judicial
• • 442
modification-or instead solidified in 1787 into a constitutional principle.
In this Article, we have shown that both sides miss a fundamental point.
Rather than being the first modem case to address common-law sovereign
immunity, the Bankers' Case was in fact the last in the line of common-law
authorities addressing the Crown's immunity in damage actions. As the
eighteenth century opened, the Glorious and Financial Revolutions had
shoved common-law sovereign immunity to the wayside. In its stead, a more
muscular Parliament asserted its supremacy in matters of spending. The
eighteenth-century American experience was no different. Colonial assem-
blies leveraged their taxation power into an appropriations power and then
leveraged that power into political preeminence. Swept up in this shifting
power was the payment of claims against the government. A party's ability
to obtain a monetary remedy from the government now rested on the
"faith"" 3 of the legislature-in other words, on the legislative power over
appropriations matters-not on abstract notions of sovereignty or on the
intricacies of dusty medieval writs.
Not everyone recognized this change. Blackstone still laid out the old
common law of sovereign immunity in his Commentaries,*" and Justice
Iredell spent pages on the common law of sovereign immunity445 before not-
ing that the law of legislative appropriations had changed the game.46 But
for cases against the sovereign seeking damages, common-law sovereign
immunity had reached the end of a path; after the Bankers' Case, the
eighteenth century yielded not a single significant English decision on
common-law sovereign immunity. As a functional and constitutional mat-
ter, the determination of the sovereign's liability for damages had shifted
from the judiciary to the legislature. That shift occurred long before the
Constitutional Convention. And nothing in the language of the Appropria-
442. Compare, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that state sovereign immunity
is constitutionally grounded), with Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 130-42, 159-68
(1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that sovereign immunity remained a common-law doctrine).
443. See supra notes 392, 395, 424-425 and accompanying text.
444. See supra notes 27, 29, 35, 41-43, 60 and accompanying text.
445. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,437-45 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
446. Id. at 445-46. After coming to this conclusion, Justice Iredell then reverted to analyzing
the common law-this time of corporations. Id. at 446-49.
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tions Clause or its history suggests any wobble in the legislature's suprem-
acy over appropriations (and thus its power to handle legal claims against
the government).
This conclusion leads to three further reflections. First, we recognize that
this history will not end the present debates over the scope of sovereign im-
munity. Well aware of the skepticism that the Supreme Court has shown for
"cobbled together" histories in law reviews, and further aware of the ongo-
ing debates about the role of originalism in constitutional interpretation,4 8 we
are not arguing that the history of the Appropriations Clause conclusively
determines the question of federal sovereign immunity today-or that the
political balance that the Appropriations Clause struck must be maintained
by modem courts that operate in a different political environment than that
of 1787.449 We are, however, recovering the history of why the balance that
was struck in the eighteenth century mattered-and why it might still matter
today. At one point, the fate of representative democracy hung by the slen-
der reed of Parliament's powers to tax and appropriate. In any discussion
over federal sovereign immunity, this political reality deserves considera-
tion.
Second, placing reliance on the Appropriations Clause as a foundation
for sovereign immunity changes the discussion about the nature of the doc-
trine. The Clause extends immunity only to damage actions against the
federal sovereign-not to injunctive claims that require no appropriations
from the Treasury, to claims against states, to damage or injunctive suits
against federal officers for which the officers are personally responsible, or
to suits against state officers.45 ° In this sense, the Clause establishes only a
partial justification for sovereign immunity; and it is for that reason-for its
failure to unite all aspects of the doctrine into a coherent theory-that some
might find the Clause an unappealing or unconvincing approach for a nor-
mative theory about the scope of sovereign immunity.
Admittedly, most participants in the normative discussion are skeptical
about a constitutional foundation for sovereign immunity; but some others
staunchly defend it.45 1 Our history finds middle ground by suggesting that
447. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68.
448. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980) (describing nonoriginal-
ism as a "view that courts should go beyond that set of references and enforce norms that cannot be
discovered within the four corners of the document"); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRE-
TATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 23-25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (expressing adherence
to a philosophy of original meaning); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 291, 295-307 (2007) (arguing for an approach faithful to text and principle).
449. Obviously, subsequent events that we have not examined might bear on the issue. The
most obvious such event is the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment in 1798. See Pfander, supra
note 6 (arguing that the First Amendment, ratified in 1791, waives sovereign immunity). But see
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 739, 739-40
(1999) (criticizing Professor Pfander's argument).
450. On these different categories of governmental liability, see supra note 7 and accompany-
ing text.
451. For some of the many contributions that view either state or federal sovereign immunity
as a doctrine changeable by courts see Borchard, supra note 5; Chemerinsky, supra note 6; Gibbons,
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federal sovereign immunity from damages actions stands on a different, and
more substantial, constitutional footing than other forms of immunity. In-
deed, the very incompleteness of the Appropriations Clause's explanatory
reach provides its justificatory force. True, it does not justify immunity in
injunctive suits against the federal government; 4 2 but, as a practical matter,
such suits have long been permitted through the fiction of official-capacity
suits.i True, the Clause provides no support for the argument that Congress
lacks power to waive state immunity for monetary claims; but that argument
is now proving highly contested and unstable.4
The Clause does, however, explain sovereign immunity for federal
monetary claims, which is the area in which sovereign immunity has always
been most impervious to attack. It explains why state legislatures cannot
waive federal sovereign immunity, and why the converse proposition-that
Congress may waive state sovereign immunity-is a thornier matter. The
Clause also suggests that federal immunity from monetary claims and state
immunity from monetary claims are not constitutionally commensurate mir-
ror images-a fact that arguably weakens (although it does not conclusively
refute) the Court's zigzagging efforts to tease the immunity of states from
congressionally authorized damages actions out of the interstices of the
Constitution .455
supra note 252; Jackson, Supreme Court, supra note 16; Jaffe, supra note 2; and Louise Weinberg,
Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1113 (2001). For a
sample of the defenders of some form of sovereign immunity, see John F. Manning, The Eleventh
Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004), and Caleb
Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1559 (2002).
Cf Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107
YALE L.J. 77, 163 (1997) ("[Courts] may properly require remedies against the state itself that are
equivalent to the traditional trespass remedy against the individual officer only when the state has
substituted a cause of action against itself for the traditional trespass suit against the officer.").
452. Such suits might be barred to the extent that they require an expenditure of funds that
Congress has not appropriated.
453. E.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); cf Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
(holding that federal courts can enjoin unconstitutional action by state officers).
454. Compare Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Commerce Clause does not authorize
Congress to authorize eo nomine damages actions against states in state court), and Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Indian Commerce Clause does not permit Congress to author-
ize eo nomine damages actions against states in federal court), with Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz,
546 U.S. 356 (2006) (Bankruptcy Clause permits Congress to authorize eo nomine actions against
states to set aside preferential transfers), and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Fourteenth
Amendment permits Congress to authorize eo nomine damages actions against states). We do not
here contend that state sovereign immunity lacks a textual foundation in the Constitution, see Nel-
son, supra note 451 (contending that the word "controversy" in Article III is such a textual
foundation), only that the Appropriations Clause is not such a text.
455, One of the arguments the Court has made when justifying state sovereign immunity is
based upon reciprocity: because the Constitution provides immunity for the federal government
from damage actions, the states therefore enjoy the same immunity. Alden, 527 U.S. at 722, 749-50.
Because the Appropriations Clause applies only to the federal government, however, the reciprocity
argument does not work.
On the other hand, we could imagine an argument for state immunity based on the principles
of the Appropriations Clause. The Clause requires that the legislative branch, including those imme-
diately elected by the people, have power to appropriate a government's funds. Congressional
waiver of a state's immunity places this power in the hands of legislators who do not appropriate the
funds-a result arguably inconsistent with the Republican Form of Government Clause, U.S.
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Third, placing reliance on the Appropriations Clause as an explanation
for sovereign immunity solves one of the doctrine's theoretical difficulties:
why Congress-rather than the President, the judiciary, the states, or even
the people-is the organ that must give consent for a waiver of federal im-
456
munity to be effective. Historically, the requirement of government
consent descends from the common law, in which the Crown's consent was
necessary for suit.457 The traditional argument for Congress's power to waive
immunity rests on the proposition that, in the Constitution, Congress suc-
ceeded to the Crown's sovereignty, including its right to waive immunity.58
But the matter is not so simple. Congress never inherited all of the sover-
eignty that the Crown once possessed; rather, the theory of the Constitution
is that sovereignty resides in the people, and the Constitution allocates as-
pects of that sovereignty among the branches of the federal government and
between the federal and state governments. 4' 9 The federal legislative branch
has preeminence in this allocation, but not the absolute sovereignty of the
ancient Crown. So why is Congress's consent to damages suits against the
United States necessary? The answer, of course, is the Appropriations
Clause, which vests appropriations decisions in the Congress.
Seemingly innocuous and self-evident, the Appropriations Clause is one
of the most profound political statements in the Constitution. In 1787,
George Mason referred to England's move away from the grant of a
perpetual revenue to the Crown, and toward control of the fisc by the
representative body of government, as "the paladium [sic] of the public
liberty.' '460 As we consider the Appropriations Clause's implications for
sovereign immunity, Mason's statement is no less true today.
CONST. art. IV, § 4, and the reserved powers of the Tenth Amendment. Cf Cincinnati Soap Co. v.
United States, 301 U.S. 308, 317 (1937) (noting that each state is sovereign, "with full powers of
taxation and full power to appropriate the revenues derived therefrom").
456. The requirement that Congress must waive the federal government's sovereign immunity
is constitutional bedrock, See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1994);
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). This idea of consent includes the power to
impose limits on the waiver of immunity. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2000) (imposing limits on the
waiver for federal tort liability).
457. See supra notes 29, 36 and accompanying text.
458. For Justice Iredell's comparable argument, see supra note 425 and accompanying text.
459. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 39, 51 (James Madison).
460. 2 FARRAND, supra note 335, at 327 (Aug. 18, 1787).
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